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Identical letters dated 17 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 14 June 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 5 to 25 May 2001 they carried out 424 sorties, 134 of them from Saudi Arabia, 160 from Kuwait and 130 from Turkey.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this unwarranted aggression and ensuring that it does not recur.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-42271 (E) 250601 250601

Annex to the identical letters dated 17 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the [Secretary-General and to the] President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They carried out 424 sorties in the period from 5 to 25 May 2001, 134 of them from Saudi Arabia, 160 from Kuwait and 130 from Turkey, as shown hereunder.

1. In the northern region 130 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1200 hours on 7 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Ayn Zalah, Dohuk, Irbil, Sinjar, Tall Afar, Mosul, Dokan and Rawanduz areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1435 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1330 hours on 15 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Zakho, Aqrah, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Rawanduz, Ayn Zalah, Irbil and Dokan areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1620 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1300 hours on 16 May 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Zakho, Aqrah, Ayn Zalah, Mosul, Tall Afar, Sinjar and Irbil areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1515 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1200 hours on 17 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Irbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Sinjar and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1530 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1130 hours on 21 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Aqrah, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1430 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1115 hours on 22 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's

airspace in the northern region. They carried out 22 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Mosul, Irbil, Aqrah, Tall Afar, Sinjar, Dokan and Rawanduz areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1420 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1145 hours on 23 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Dohuk, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar, and Ayn Zalah areas. GBU-12 laser-guided bombs were dropped in the Sahaji area of Mosul, causing material and other damage to residential complexes. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1520 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 197 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1420 hours on 6 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 15 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and five from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Umm Qasr, Shinafiyah, Lasaf, Salman and Artawi areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1535 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1100 hours on 7 May 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out four missions from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace and an AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace. They overflew the Jalibah and Busayyah areas, an area 30 kilometres south-west of Nasiriyah and an area 40 kilometres south of Salman. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1225 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 0910 hours on 8 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 35 missions, 17 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 18 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Shinafiyah, Ashbajah, Salman, Amarah and Jalibah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1125 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 0905 hours on 9 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 31 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control

aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 21 from the Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Salman, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Qurnah, Shinafiyah and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1130 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 0835 hours on 10 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 31 missions, eight of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 23 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Shinafiyah, Taqtaqanah, Safwan, Salman, Jalibah and Artawi areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1020 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1045 hours on 13 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 31 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 19 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Basrah, Qurnah, Jalibah, Artawi and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1250 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1015 hours on 14 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 22 missions from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 10 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basrah, Shinafiyah, Lasaf and Ashbajah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1200 hours, drove them off.

(h) At 1000 hours on 16 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out eight missions, four of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and four from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Salman, Lasaf, Jalibah, Shatrah, Ashbajah and Basrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1140 hours, drove them off.

(i) At 0900 hours on 17 May 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out four missions from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating

inside Saudi airspace. They overflew the Salman and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1000 hours, drove them off.

(j) At 1050 hours on 18 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out nine missions, four of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and five from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Basrah, Samawah, Qal`at Salih, Amarah, Hayy, Jalibah and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1300 hours, drove them off.

(k) At 0900 hours on 19 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 30 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 20 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah, Artawi, Samawah, Lasaf, Nasiriyah, Mashkhab, Basrah, Qurnah, Qal`at Salih, Shatrah, Diwaniyah and Najaf areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1100 hours, drove them off.

(l) At 1420 hours on 22 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 21 missions, 15 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and six from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Diwaniyah, Karbala', Najaf, Shinafiyah, Hayy, Kut, Afak, Amarah, Salman and Qal`at Salih areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1630 hours, drove them off.

(m) At 1340 hours on 23 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 21 missions, 13 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and eight from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shinafiyah, Lasaf, Nukhayb, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Hashimiyah, Qal`at Sukkar and Salman areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1630 hours, drove them off.

(n) At 1515 hours on 24 May 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out five missions, two of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and three from Kuwaiti territory by way of the

demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah and Ma`aniyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1800 hours, drove them off.

(o) At 1425 hours on 25 May 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 27 missions, 13 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 14 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Diwaniyah, Hayy, Qal`at Salih, Salman, Busayyah and Ashbajah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1630 hours, drove them off.

This aggression illustrates the bellicose attitude being maintained by the United States of America and the United Kingdom towards Iraq. Since 1992, it has become a fixed policy aimed at undermining the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and at the systematic and concerted destruction of Iraqi lives, infrastructure and civilian installations. It is a policy that has been affirmed in successive statements made by United States and British officials.

The Government of Iraq categorically rejects the two so-called no-flight zones, which were imposed by unilateral decision of the United States and the United Kingdom and lack any legal basis. Iraq rejects all the consequences of this illegal decision and, in particular, the flimsy excuses and pretexts used by these States in an attempt to justify their military aggression against our country.

The logistic support provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey to the Americans and the British has made these countries key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they bear full international responsibility under international law. This includes liability for full compensation for the loss and damage, in both human and material terms, that is caused by these illegal practices.

The Government of Iraq further renews its call to the countries participating in this aggression to desist forthwith from internationally prohibited acts that violate Iraq's sovereignty, place its security and integrity in grave danger and pose a direct and serious threat to international peace and security.

As it condemns these acts of aggression against Iraqi targets and installations, the Government of Iraq urges you to perform the duties assigned to you [under the Charter] as they relate to the maintenance of international peace and security by intervening with the governments of the countries in question with a view to inducing them to halt, end and desist from any resumption of their constant and unwarranted aggression against an independent, sovereign State.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2001/621

Security Council

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Letter dated 20 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions of my Government and in reference to the item entitled "The Situation in East Timor", I have the honour to enclose herewith a document concerning the findings of the international observers on the registration of East Timorese in Nusa Tenggara Timur, dated 6 June 2001.

In this regard, the results of the registration process reflect that from a total of 113,791 participants, 1,250 (1.10 per cent) East Timorese refugees elected to return to East Timor while 111,540 (98.02 per cent) opted to remain in Indonesia and 1,010 (0.88 per cent) abstained.

It would therefore be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Makmur **Widodo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-42278 (E) 260601

Annex to letter dated 20 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Findings of the international observers on the registration of East Timorese in Nusa Tenggara Timur 6 June 2001

Terms of reference

On 6 June 2001, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia conducted a registration of East Timorese refugees in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur. The objective of the registration was to both ascertain the precise number of East Timorese currently in Nusa Tenggara Timur as well as to determine how many wished to remain in Indonesia and how many wished to return to East Timor. The results of the registration were expected to assist the Government in planning concrete actions to lead towards a solution to the East Timorese refugee problem.

Twelve international observers were present in five districts on the day of registration. As described in their terms of reference, drafted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the objective of the observers was to attend and observe all steps of the registration procedure on the day, namely:

- The assembly and briefing of refugees;
- The conformity of registration facilities with those agreed upon;
- Presence in the registration area and around registration facilities;
- The identity of registration personnel and interpreters;
- The completion of registration forms;
- The confidentiality and integrity of the procedure;
- The completion of data analysis.

The observers attest to the fact that they were given full and free access, and were facilitated in this through the provision of security personnel and government liaison officers. The observers would like to record that the accompanying government officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Transmigration and Manpower, and Housing and Public Works greatly facilitated their work and their access to the registration process.

Composition of the team

The following States and international organizations contributed observers:

Brunei
China
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Mozambique
Norway
Philippines

Portugal
Thailand
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

The IOM observer was selected as Coordinator by the other observers. Those observers who so wished were free to bring along interpreters of their own choosing. Four did so.

Geographical areas covered

The observers were present in all five districts of West Timor. The selection of the subdistricts visited was largely made on the basis of logistical considerations. None were present in Nusa Tenggara Timur districts on other islands. Registration points were visited in the following subdistricts:

District	*Subdistrict*
Kota Kupang	Alak
	Kelapa Lima
	Oebobo
Kupang	Kupang Timur
	Kupang Tengah
Timor Tengah Selatan	Soe
Timor Tengah Utara	Kefamenanu
	Insana Utara
Belu	Atambua
	Tasifeto Barat
	Tasifeto Timur

In selecting their sites, observers attempted where possible to visit a mixture that would include urban and rural, camp and non-camp. Of 507 registration points located throughout Nusa Tenggara Timur, the observers visited 120 in 11 subdistricts between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 June.

A comparison of the observers' notes showed little difference in the observations made between the different districts and subdistricts. As such it is felt that the number and location of the sites visited were sufficient to enable the observers to draw conclusions from their observations that hold true for the registration process on the day.

Procedural observations

As per their terms of reference the observers informed registration supervisors, either directly or through their liaison officers, of any anomalies observed and in some instances assisted in rectifying them. The observers undertook their work

through visual inspection as well as through interviews with registration officials, refugee leaders and refugees.

Registration point set-up and materials

The registration was set to begin at 8 a.m. but the actual time of starting varied from one registration point to another, with the latest starting time observed being 10.30. The most often cited reason for delay was the late arrival of materials. In one instance refugees were waiting for a "government official" to be present before having it explained that the registrars and supervisor were mandated by the Government.

Overall, registration points were set up correctly with acceptable variations from the official guidelines. The actual size of the registration points varied considerably, as did the materials used for their "construction". These included tarpaulins, plastic sheeting and corrugated sheets. In some instances house porches were used. In some cases the registration points were only delineated by twine stretched around poles which, as the day wore on, tended to disappear as refugees pressed forward.

All registration points observed, except one, had closed polling booths that allowed for marking one's ballot in privacy. All polling booths were equipped with a nail for marking the ballot.

In the majority of sites visited all registration materials were present, but instances of missing materials were observed in some registration points. These included identity cards and registration forms. However, contingency plans had been made for such occurrences and, apart from contributing to overruns in time, this is not expected to have had an effect on the overall results.

Personnel

Registration personnel were selected at the village level, and there were considerable variations in their education level and competency. Registrars came from all walks of life and included, inter alia, village and sub-village chiefs, other public servants, students, housewives and church and non-governmental organizations workers. All registrars questioned were from the local surrounding communities.

Village officials had the responsibility for selecting the number of registrars. In some cases only two registrars were present. In one case observed the number of four registrars was increased to eight as night approached and many refugees remained to be registered.

Several registrars complained of having only received the registration procedure guidelines the day before and not being sufficiently trained. This in large part explained why registration often progressed very slowly in the early part of the day, to accelerate later as registrars became more familiar with procedures. The registration procedures being relatively simple to follow, this is not expected to have had an effect on the overall results.

In all registration points observed two security officers from either POLRI (Indonesian National Police) or TNI (Indonesian armed forces) were present. The

security personnel's presence remained visible but discreet, and no disturbances were observed.

At least one refugee community leader, and often two, was present in most registration points observed. Their role was to facilitate the refugees' participation through providing explanations and translating where necessary, and assisting in the overall organization. The refugee leaders were not directly mingled with registration officials and were not seen working with registration forms. On one occasion a refugee leader was observed sitting outside the polling booth holding the envelope for the marked ballots, but this was immediately rectified.

All registration officials were observed to have appropriate identification. This was not, however, the case for refugee leaders, which sometimes made it difficult for observers to clearly identify them as persons authorized to be present in the registration point. As the day wore on there were, especially in the more populated sites, increasing instances of refugees crowding inside the registration points rather than forming orderly queues.

Integrity and confidentiality

All forms observed were completed and interviews were carried out in the presence of family members. The observers are unable to comment on the eligibility of those registering as defined by the registration technical guidelines.

In all registration points observed, proper ink marking was made on all family members. On one occasion a government official mentioned to an observer that he had seen children leave the registration point without an ink marking but he brought them back. This lapse was apparently due to poor organization of the registration point and had been rectified.

All but one of the polling booths observed provided adequate privacy for refugees to mark their ballots demonstrating the choice between remaining in Indonesia or returning to East Timor. Envelopes rather than ballot boxes were used for receiving the ballots. The location of the envelopes varied from one registration point to another. In some cases the envelope was hanging just outside the booth, while in others it was placed on a table next to a registration official. In several registration points the unsealed envelopes were positioned inside the polling booth.

The observers note that the balloting was open to all adults aged 17 and over, and that women were participating fully in the process.

The observers feel it would have been more appropriate and would have better ensured confidentiality if sealed ballot boxes had been placed inside the booths. As it was, the refugees had to exit the booth with the folded ballot in their hand before depositing it in the envelope, the location of which varied from being just outside the booth to some three metres away. The observers, however, agree that minimum standards of confidentiality were respected in the registration points observed.

The policy on the counting of ballots was that this should be undertaken at the registration point but without the result being announced. However, due to pressure from the refugees who wished to ensure transparency, it was agreed that the announcement could be made immediately upon completion of the counting. The observers concur that the immediate public announcement of the count bore no adverse effect on the overall result. All ballot counting observed was carried out in

the proper manner by registration officials in the presence of a refugee witness. Other refugees were able to witness the counting from the registration point perimeters. No cases of interference were observed, and the presence of refugees is not judged to have affected the result.

General observations

The observers applaud the overall organization of the registration of refugees in Nusa Tenggara Timur province on 6 June, particularly in view of the logistical challenges involved in setting up 507 registration points throughout the province. Registration officials were observed to be keenly committed to carrying out the procedures as instructed by registration guidelines.

Equally, the observers commend the security arrangements implemented by the Indonesian authorities, which ensured a generally incident-free day. At no time was any direct physical intimidation of refugees or officials observed.

It became clear by midday, especially in camp locations, that many registration points would not be able to complete the registration by 5 p.m. Several observers visited registration points during the evening of 6 June and observed the process continuing by candlelight or electricity when it was available. No significant differences were found in the manner in which the registration was conducted after nightfall. The observers agree with the Government's decision to extend the registration beyond the planned 5 p.m. deadline in order to ensure the registration of all interested refugees, but they note that they were not present at the registration beyond 6 June.

The observers' findings did not markedly differ from one district or subdistrict to another, leading them to believe that the observations made in the 120 selected registration points can be considered applicable to the overall registration process on the given day. Clear differences did, however, emerge between observations made in registration points at camp and non-camp locations.

Non-camp locations were generally less crowded. Registration officials were firmly in charge of organizing the process and, in several instances observed, registration supervisors had experience in organizing elections, which clearly contributed to the professional manner in which the registration was conducted in their locations.

In camp locations refugee leaders were generally more active in organizing the process, controlling the larger crowds and providing explanations and information to what appeared to the observers as being a generally less well-educated and informed refugee population.

However, although the need for refugee leaders to be present in the registration points is understood, greater care should have been taken to define their role and to provide clear identification to those with authorization to be present. Equally, more effort could have been made by registration officials to control the crowding in and around the registration sites. Responses by refugee leaders to observers' questions as to how many refugees they estimated were going to register at their sites ranged from giving precise numbers to being unable to give any figure at all.

In both camp and non-camp locations registration officials and refugee leaders were forthcoming in answering observers' questions and facilitating the observation

process. Outside of the camps refugees were generally open to being interviewed by observers on the subjects of whether they had received sufficient information and understood the process in which they were participating, as well as the implications of the choices on the ballot. In the camp registration points refugees were generally more hesitant to speak to the observers and, in several instances, were actively discouraged from doing so by refugee leaders.

Overall, refugees appeared to be aware of the importance of registering and did so with enthusiasm. Equally, they appeared to understand all the steps in the registration process. There was less clarity in their understanding of the implications of the ballot choices. Most refugees questioned responded that they had been reached by the socialization campaigns conducted by both the Government and refugee organizations, though a number indicated their feeling that the information provided was insufficient. The observers noticed in many instances information posters in the registration points, however some refugees complained that not enough was written in Tetun.

A number of refugees questioned stated that the timing of the ballot was not ideal. Opting for return was widely understood as meaning that they would have to do so almost immediately, thereby, as explained by the refugees, not allowing them to wait first for the results of the East Timor elections, forfeiting the right to any severance package in the case of government employees and preventing children in school from taking exams.

At the same time, the overwhelming majority of refugees interviewed held high expectations of the assistance that was to be provided to those opting to stay in Indonesia.

As a final observation, the observers wish to draw attention to the unexpectedly large total number of refugees who registered as indicated by preliminary announcements from the Indonesian Government Media Centre. In their selected locations, and during the periods of their observation, the observers did not witness any irregularities that can lead them to comment on these preliminary results. The observers cannot validate the final number of those who registered. Based, however, on their observation that the registration forms were generally properly completed, they suggest that a thorough analysis of the collected data should enable the Government to detect any such irregularities. This analysis should also clarify the number of refugees who left East Timor in 1999 and remain in Nusa Tenggara Timur, as distinguished from those who form part of the broader categories of persons eligible for registration.

Conclusions

The overall goal of the observers in participating in the registration was to support the Government of the Republic of Indonesia's commitment and efforts to find durable solutions to the East Timorese refugee problem. The observers hope that both the Government and the international community view the findings as a positive contribution towards this end.

Overall, the observers conclude that, despite the insufficiencies noted above, the registration process and balloting were carried out on the day in a manner that respected procedures and confidentiality to an acceptable degree. The observers trust that the collected data will be analysed carefully by the Government in order to

ensure the credibility of the results. They further note that, based on their observations, the ballot should be viewed as a choice made by the refugees on the day, and not necessarily as an indication of their permanent intentions.

The observers reiterate their appreciation to the Registration Chairman, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Government of Nusa Tenggara Timur, the police and the armed forces for sparing no efforts in facilitating their full, free and secure access to the registration points.

Done in Jakarta 15 June 2001

On behalf of the International Observers
The Observer Coordinator
Head of the IOM Liaison Office for Indonesia

(*Signed*) Richard **Danziger**

United Nations S/2001/622

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 June 2001

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1233 (1999) of 6 April 1999, by which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed and to submit a report every 90 days on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS).

2. Members of the Security Council will recall that in my last report, of 16 March 2001 (S/2001/237), I described the efforts of the Government to preserve and consolidate the country's nascent democratic order in the aftermath of the failed November 2000 coup attempt as well as activities of UNOGBIS in support of those efforts.

3. Following the discussion of that report, the Security Council, on 29 March 2001, in a statement to the press, called upon all parties to cooperate towards forming a broad-based and effective government, encouraged the leaders of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal to continue their bilateral efforts to stabilize the situation along their common border and called upon the international community to provide urgent assistance to enable the Government of Guinea-Bissau to meet the most basic needs of the country's population.

4. Subsequently, on 10 April 2001, Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall, briefing the Security Council on the conclusions and recommendations of the Inter-Agency Mission that I had dispatched to West Africa from 6 to 27 March 2001 (S/2001/434), reported that the overall situation in Guinea-Bissau remained volatile, with a high risk of continuing instability in the near and medium term. He indicated that the Inter-Agency Mission had concluded that urgent financial and capacity-building assistance by the international community was needed to help prevent Guinea-Bissau from relapsing into open conflict.

5. The present report covers developments since my report of 16 March 2001 and Mr. Fall's briefing, highlighting, in particular, efforts to stabilize the situation in the country and to strengthen fragile democratic institutions, in order to enable them to address more effectively the urgent political, economic, social and security crises the country faces. The report also outlines the contributions of UNOGBIS to the difficult but ongoing post-conflict peace-building process.

II. Political developments

6. The political situation has been dominated in the period under review by strong and prolonged friction between the executive and the legislative branches of government over the choice of Prime Minister. Faustino Imbali, whom President Kumba Yala appointed on 20 March 2001, was vehemently opposed by parliamentarians, mainly from opposition parties, but also including members of the President's party, the Party of Social Renewal (PRS), which Mr. Imbali, formerly an independent presidential candidate, joined a week before his appointment as Prime Minister. Led by the opposition, the National Assembly repeatedly refused to confirm Mr. Imbali and his Government. As a result, through the months of April and May, the

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country practically operated without an effective government, and the announcement of yet another foiled coup attempt in mid-April demonstrated once again the fragility of the political and democratic processes. Amid rising social tensions, the National Assembly, on 30 April, convened, at the opposition's demand, in an extraordinary session to discuss the country's instability. The Assembly gave the Government a month to present its programme and the budget.

7. During this unstable period, civil society, led by the Bishop of Bissau, called upon political actors to engage in dialogue in order to stabilize the country. For his part, my Representative, Samuel C. Nana-Sinkam, continued to provide his good offices to facilitate compromise. Finally, on 17 May, the National Assembly, by a vote of 56 to 43, approved the programme of work of Mr. Imbali's Government, which was composed of 23 members drawn mainly from the President's PRS party, but also included several ministers serving in an independent capacity. On 30 May, the Assembly approved the Government's budget, with 56 parliamentarians voting for it and 39 abstaining.

8. To promote a culture of peace, tolerance and political dialogue, UNOGBIS organized in Bissau, from 28 March to 1 June 2001, a seminar on the consolidation of multi-party democracy in collaboration with the country's 17 political parties and the parliament; this was a follow-up to a similar seminar held in January 2001. The seminar, funded by the Government of the Netherlands, brought together 120 representatives of political parties, the media, civil society and trade unions, and included 50 women. Discussions were facilitated by six international and four Bissau Guinean experts who focused on the promotion of better understanding of the principles of a democratic society.

9. UNOGBIS has also continued to provide legal expertise, as needed, to the Technical Committee on the Review of the Constitution established by the National Assembly with a view to bringing the country's Constitution in line with internationally recognized norms.

10. Despite persistent political instability, preparations have continued for municipal elections, now scheduled for December 2001 or early January 2002. The National Assembly has received the recommendations of the inter-ministerial Technical Committee on electoral legislation and intends to finalize it shortly. The Committee, which continues to benefit from the services of an electoral expert provided by the United Nations, has already prepared the electoral budget. However, owing to financial difficulties, implementation of the various recommendations has been stalled, and the Government has indicated its intention to seek assistance from the donor community for the organization and conduct of the elections.

11. At the international level, Guinea-Bissau has continued to strengthen cooperation with its immediate neighbours and beyond the subregion. In particular, following President Yala's visit to Conakry from 30 April 2001 to 2 May 2001, he and President Conté signed a protocol on friendly relations and good-neighbourliness and called for the strengthening of bilateral cooperation, especially in the socio-economic and political domains. During his second visit to Abuja, from 13 to 15 June, President Yala and his Nigerian counterpart, President Obasanjo, agreed to strengthen bilateral economic cooperation. To that end, Nigerian entrepreneurs are expected in Bissau shortly to explore investment prospects. President Obasanjo also presented President Yala with a financial contribution of US$ 1 million to assist, in particular, with the Government's efforts to restructure the Bissau Guinean armed forces.

III. Military and security aspects

12. The activities of rebels of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) in the border areas between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal remained the most serious security challenge to Guinea-Bissau during the period. Since Bissau Guinean forces launched a military offensive against the rebels in March 2001 to force them from the country's north-west region, the border situation has remained tense. Armed skirmishes between the rival factions of MFDC continue, sometimes on Bissau Guinean territory, and have caused additional security problems, especially when innocent civilians have been killed or hurt as a side effect of the fighting. Following a recent upsurge in fighting between forces of the Government of Senegal and MDFC rebels in Casamance Province, Bissau Guinean forces reinforced

their border presence to prevent the possible retreat of MFDC rebels into Guinea-Bissau.

13. The ongoing MFDC rebel military operations, including the mines reportedly planted by them in the border area, not only heighten insecurity but have virtually paralysed economic and social activities along the border. The presence of over 3,000 refugees from Casamance, some of whom are alleged to have links with the rebels, complicates the situation further. At the request of the Government, the regional office for West and Central Africa of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) dispatched a mission to Guinea-Bissau from 16 to 25 April to assess the refugee situation along the country's border with the Senegalese province of Casamance. The mission examined, in particular, possibilities of and constraints to the resettlement of the refugees away from the border or for their voluntary return to Senegal. Following the mission's determination of the logistical, financial and other requirements of possible refugee relocation, the Governments concerned are currently studying the next step to be taken.

14. Largely owing to border security concerns, the restructuring of the armed forces, although agreed to in principle, has not advanced significantly in practice. The process has also been affected by lingering tensions within the military relating to the detention of several military officers over allegations of complicity in the November 2000 failed coup attempt, the non-payment of salaries and divisions in the armed forces along party, religious and ethnic lines. The critical lack of financial resources for retraining of the armed forces to transform them into a professional republican army is also blamed for the slow pace of the military restructuring process.

15. The tensions within the armed forces described above have also contributed to delays in the implementation of the Government's Programme of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration, which the World Bank estimates might require approximately $17 million. Some progress has nevertheless been made, facilitated by continued technical and financial assistance of the Bank. As a result, the pilot exercise for the Programme was completed on 8 May, when 571 former combatants were demobilized in a public ceremony and were assured that they would be reintegrated into civilian life.

16. In another positive development in the security domain, on 5 June, border guards who had been deployed to combat duty in 1998 to support the Government's armed forces during the civil war returned to their regular guard duties under the command of the Ministry of Internal Administration. The Minister of Defence, for his part, welcomed this development as an important step in the reorganization of the armed forces.

17. With regard to the demining programme, ongoing activities have focused on the most heavily populated areas. By 31 May, mine-clearing operations led by HUMAID, an international NGO, and facilitated by UNOGBIS had resulted in the destruction of over 2,000 mines. It is estimated that $2 million would be needed to remove the estimated 5,000 mines remaining in and around the capital, Bissau.

IV. Economic and social aspects

18. The persistent volatility of the political and military situation in Guinea-Bissau is both a cause and a consequence of the country's economic deterioration. As rampant poverty deepens, social tensions have increased, contributing to a political and security climate of instability which discourages investment. In addition, public sector employees, suffering from many months of unpaid wages, have organized demonstrations and labour strikes which have further decreased economic productivity and increased unemployment.

19. Against that background of limited economic output and unstable prices for cashew, the country's principal source of revenue, Guinea-Bissau is suffering from a sever liquidity crisis, with foreign assistance currently accounting for some 80 per cent of the national budget of about 95 billion CFA francs.

20. As the economy has stagnated, concern is growing that masses of the unemployed or underemployed, especially young people, could increasingly be drawn into illegal arms and drug trafficking as well as prostitution, further fuelling insecurity and the risk of the spread of HIV/AIDS.

21. The United Nations country team has been assisting the Government in addressing some of these potentially explosive socio-economic challenges. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), on 17 April, signed a three-year financial assistance

agreement in the amount of $3.7 million to support the Government's governance programme which, if implemented, should provide a catalytic boost to the peace-building process. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) have launched a comprehensive national programme to combat HIV/AIDS. In an initiative designed to promote vocational training and small businesses, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), on 15 May, signed an agreement with the Government for the training of Bissau Guineans in laboratory science, fish processing and management techniques in the fishery industry.

22. To evaluate overall economic performance, including the state of the structural adjustment programme initiated in 2000, a joint mission of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund visited Guinea-Bissau at the end of May. As a result, the Bretton Woods institutions have postponed until November 2001 their final periodic evaluation of the Government's performance targets which, as the mission's initial assessment concluded, the Government had not met. The mission also called for greater transparency in the disbursement of government funds.

V. Human rights

23. UNOGBIS has continued to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau. During the period under review, UNOGBIS focused on supporting, as appropriate, the Government's efforts to ensure due process with respect to the 169 persons originally detained on suspicion of complicity in the November 2000 failed coup attempt. Much progress has been made to that end, and by 13 June, only 11 officers remained in detention, the rest having been provisionally released pending trial. As government officials continue efforts to ameliorate detention conditions, a United Nations doctor in Bissau is providing detainees with basic health care, while UNICEF is making available medicines and potable water.

24. To help strengthen the operational capacity of the legislature and the judiciary as pivotal institutions in the process of democratic consolidation, the Government of the United States of America is funding, through its Agency for International Development (USAID), a government programme developed in cooperation with UNOGBIS and UNDP to train Bissau Guinean legislators and judicial personnel and to provide logistical support to the National Assembly, the Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney-General.

25. Following reports in late May that some Casamance refugees had allegedly been forcibly returned to Senegal, representatives of the Government, UNOGBIS and UNHCR visited the border area on 30 May. They found that, as a result of armed skirmishes between MFDC rebels and Bissau Guinean forces on Bissau Guinean territory, 11 houses in a village where the refugees lived had been burned, forcing them to flee. According to UNHCR, 53 of the refugees have voluntarily returned to Senegal, while 36 others have chosen to remain in Guinea-Bissau.

VI. Observations

26. As in any similar situation, post-conflict peace-building is a sensitive and painstaking process. Rebuilding societies torn apart by war, including narrowing differences among different segments of the population and moving towards genuine national reconciliation, is bound to take time. Such an undertaking is even more arduous in an environment such as Guinea-Bissau whose long history of armed struggle has left a legacy of weapons circulating widely in society, amidst rampant poverty. Developments during the period under review have confirmed, regrettably, that efforts at healing and reconstructing the country remain difficult.

27. In previous reports I have underscored the need for financial support for Guinea-Bissau's newly restored democratic institutions in order to enable them to function effectively and take root. Significant contributions have been made to that end which have helped advance efforts to consolidate the country's peace-building agenda. As the present report indicates, however, much more remains to be done. Critical measures that are required, for instance, to restructure the armed forces, to achieve effective demobilization and reintegration and to ensure the smooth functioning of national institutions of government continue to lag owing to the lack of the necessary financial and logistical resources. As a result, essential institutions are unable to function as efficiently as possible, contributing to a climate of frustration and tension

which, in turn, lowers productivity and discourages economic investment.

28. The fact that Guinea-Bissau continues to depend heavily on foreign assistance to meet state expenditures is a strong indication of the enduring nature of the difficulties the country faces, in both the immediate and the medium terms. Overcoming these challenges will remain a collective endeavour, involving the renewed commitment of the international community to provide assistance along with the demonstration of the necessary political will by the Government and people of Guinea-Bissau themselves to do what is needed to move their country forward. Clearly, not everything can be achieved quickly or at the same time. As the country's democratization process advances, the transparent management of state affairs should be able to show that the burden is being borne by all sectors of society.

29. It is important to keep the national interest above all other considerations, even as political differences among the various institutions of government reflect the pluralism of a country's democracy. The recent prolonged stand-off between the executive and the legislature over the confirmation of the President's choice of Prime Minister and over the approval of the Government's budget and programme of work often appeared to overshadow the more urgent needs the country faces. I am relieved that this impasse was overcome and that the leaders of the country have once again begun to focus on the national challenges at hand. If international support is to be effective on the ground, it needs to have, at all times, an effective and credible national partner leading the way.

30. I commend the efforts of President Kumba Yala and his Government to promote constructive and cooperative relations in the subregion and especially with Guinea-Bissau's immediate neighbours. Such improvements can help advance cross-border trade and security; conversely, without improved ties it would be difficult for Guinea-Bissau and its neighbours to carry on normal trade and other relations which are in the mutual interest of all the States and peoples concerned.

31. The challenges are many and the efforts sometimes frustrating, but the international community must continue to assist Guinea-Bissau. I therefore express my appreciation to those Member States and international organizations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, that have remained supportive of the Government's reconstruction efforts, and have also contributed to the trust fund set up to finance the peace-building activities being undertaken by UNOGBIS. I commend in particular Nigeria's generous contribution to help facilitate the restructuring of the army, one of the critical sectors of the ongoing peace-building process.

32. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to my Representative, Samuel C. Nana-Sinkam, and to the staff of the entire United Nations country team for their unflinching dedication to the cause of peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau. I also wish to recognize the important contributions of members of the United Nations country team on the ground in Guinea-Bissau and urge them and all other partners to remain engaged.

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Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country

Corrigendum

Page 2, paragraph 8

For 28 March *read* 28 May

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United Nations S/2001/623

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Letter dated 21 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Following the issuance, on 20 June 2001, of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2001/613), I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to transmit to you the following comments:

1. Departing from its role of neutrality and objectivity in the description of the facts and the presentation of the arguments, the Secretariat has deliberately set out to prove, even if it means twisting facts and truncating arguments, that the settlement plan which has been accepted by the parties to the conflict and enjoys the unanimous support of the international community is not workable; and to reject in an unacceptably casual way, although it clearly does not have the right to do so, nor does it exactly correspond to its role, the constructive proposals which one of the parties to the conflict, the Polisario, submitted to the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, specifically with the objective of overcoming the obstacles in the way of the implementation of the plan.

2. Similarly, the Secretariat has taken it upon itself to champion an autonomy plan, the author of which is not revealed in the report; it is quite clear, however, that the Secretariat unconditionally supports that author, because of its commendatory attitude.

Far more seriously, departing from the course of conduct to which it had previously always adhered, the Secretariat decided, with the same unacceptable casualness it demonstrated with regard to the Polisario proposals, to reject by a stroke of the pen, in a disrespectful manner, the objections by Algeria which were clearly not addressed to it, since the Secretary-General had been requested to bring them to the attention of the Member States, which would then be the sole judges of those proposals.

In rejecting the serious and well-argued objections which Algeria made with regard to a draft statute which it does not consider, and could not under any circumstances consider, as the basis for a just, equitable and final political solution to the question of Western Sahara, the Secretariat is not only acting as if it were a party, but is quite simply deciding to ignore the point of view of an important actor from whom moreover, irony of ironies, it is striving to obtain a stronger commitment with a view to the promotion of a negotiated settlement.

Moreover, in deciding to publish the contents of the letters sent by the President of the Republic to the Secretary-General and to his Personal Envoy, even

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though it did not have the express consent of Algeria and it had been requested in the body of the letter itself to transmit the text of the memorandum only to Member States, the Secretariat violated the sacrosanct rules of confidentiality which govern relations and communications between Member States and the United Nations and, in so doing, acted in an astonishingly offhand manner.

In shamelessly taking sides on an extremely sensitive issue, in arrogating the right to criticize openly, and without restraint, the positions of a Member State which were not addressed to it, in making countless intrusions into an area which is strictly within the competence of Member States and particularly the Security Council, and in making one blunder and one mistake after another, the Secretariat in short, has discredited itself, thereby demonstrating that it is not acting within the clearly understood interests of all the Member States, or in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is evident that these grave actions must be formally condemned and severely penalized by the first officer of the Organization.

3. With regard to the substance of the recommendations made in the report, Algeria, which remains firmly committed to a just and final solution of the conflict in Western Sahara, would like to make the following clarifications:

- While it has indicated its willingness to support Mr. Baker's efforts and is prepared to continue to do so if these efforts are directed towards the search for genuine alternative solutions inspired by justice and equity which are capable of restoring peace and stability for all the peoples of the region in a lasting manner, Algeria cannot accept that the settlement plan should be dismissed in such a cavalier manner and that the Polisario proposals for relaunching its implementation should be set aside, without being given serious consideration by the other party to the conflict and the members of the Security Council;

Similarly, Algeria cannot accept that an autonomy plan which, in good faith, it has endeavoured to show could not constitute a serious and credible basis for a just and final settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara, should continue to be presented as the single and only way of settling the conflict, despite the strong objections it has made against that plan.

Since the process of the settlement of the question of Western Sahara is now at a crucial stage, Algeria calls upon the Security Council to assume its responsibilities to the full, by stopping the dangerous drift which is threatening the process, by reaffirming its commitment to the settlement plan, and by reiterating the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, in the same terms it has used now for a year.

I should be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements to have the text of this letter circulated to the members of the Security Council and to have it issued as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) Abdallah **Baali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/624

Security Council

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21 June 2001
English
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Letter dated 21 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In the early hours of 15 April 1986, a terrorist act of aggression was committed by the United States against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in which hundreds of innocent civilians were killed and injured while asleep in their homes. At that time, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya turned to the Security Council and sought its condemnation of the aggression and justice for the victims. The Council was, however, unable to take any action because of the use of the veto by the United States and its allies.

In contrast to this, in 1992 the Security Council was impelled to act with the utmost speed in acceding to the demands made by the United States with regard to the Lockerbie affair. It did so despite the fact that those demands were unjust and lacked any legal basis whatever and in the absence of any material evidence, as was subsequently confirmed by the Judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice in 1998 establishing its jurisdiction to consider the case.

The Lockerbie affair is a criminal case that was improperly politicized. The historical circumstances resulting from the breakdown of the previous international equilibrium was exploited for the purpose of exercising hegemony over the Council and directing its actions by exerting all manner of pressure on its members. Articles 27, 33 and 36 of the Charter of the United Nations were thus violated in the manner in which the Council addressed this issue in particular as well as other issues, and international conventions were abrogated, the most important in the present case being the 1971 Montreal Convention.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a State of laws, and it is in the vanguard of those States that respect international law and comply with it and satisfy its requirements. For this reason, Libya has been among those few countries that have made a greater effort than others to avail themselves of the services of the International Court of Justice. The Court has rendered judgments in several cases involving the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, among the most significant being that establishing its jurisdiction to consider the Lockerbie case and accepting the Libyan interpretation of international law as placing States and peoples on an equal footing regardless of their size, wealth or power. Accordingly, it now demands that the United Nations and its Security Council should comply with international law, should apply justice and equity to all Members of the Organization and should respect and implement the Charter with impartiality for the benefit for all.

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Continued disregard for international law can only undermine security, order and peace in the world, exacerbate crises among States and bring about a return to a climate of tension and confrontation and to the arms race.

Since the end of the Second World War, successive United States administrations have borne special responsibility for the state in which the Security Council finds itself. The new United States administration has a rare opportunity to remedy this situation and to demonstrate its respect for international law and its commitment to equality among the world's States and peoples by taking the proper and sound decision and remedying the injustice done to the Libyan people over the past decades by the hegemonistic policies of the United States. A first step in the right direction would be to provide an opportunity to bring United States officials to trial for the 1986 murder of those of our sons and daughters whose names are listed in document S/1999/457.

This case will remain open and it will remain before the Security Council until such time as the Council is able to act in accordance with international law and to comply with the Charter of the United Nations, in whose name it acts and which places all States and peoples without exception on an equal footing, and until such time as it adopts a resolution accepting the demands of the Libyan people that those responsible for the crimes committed against it on the night of 15 April 1986 should be brought to trial and that the families of the victims should be compensated. We hope that this issue will not remain before the Council for a long period of time without being settled.

Accordingly, Libya calls upon the Security Council to take the following measures:

1. To acknowledge the responsibility of those who perpetrated the crime of armed military aggression committed on 15 April 1986 against the Libyan people and the installations damaged by it, and to call upon the Government of the United States of America to accede to the request for the extradition of all the United States nationals charged with committing that crime so that they may appear before the Libyan courts in the two cases brought against them, as set forth in document S/1999/457, and to cooperate with the Libyan judicial authorities in this regard;

2. To acknowledge the basic right of Libya and of the individuals harmed by the aforesaid military aggression to just and appropriate compensation to redress the wrong done to them;

3. To call upon the Government of the United States of America to accept full responsibility for the actions of those Americans responsible for the military aggression in question and to pay appropriate compensation to those harmed;

4. To acknowledge the right of Libya to just compensation for the damage and losses it has sustained owing to the sanctions that were maintained against it over a seven-year period as a result of resolutions the Security Council was constrained to adopt, without any legal foundation and in the absence of material evidence, in the context of the so-called Lockerbie affair.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abuzed Omar **Dorda**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/625

Security Council

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22 June 2001

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Letter dated 18 June 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 15 June 2001 from Mr. Monie R. Captan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia, addressed to the Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) concerning United Kingdom-supplied ammunition allegedly captured in Lofa county, Liberia (S/2001/595, annex).

The United Kingdom has not supplied any arms or ammunition to dissident movements in the Mano River region. As is well known, the British Government has been supplying equipment to the Sierra Leone Army and has been instructing the Army in control and accounting procedures for all their equipment, including arms and ammunition. The British Government has fully complied with all regulations of the Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations concerning the import of weapons to Sierra Leone. The United Kingdom notes that considerable quantities of equipment were captured by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in May 2000, which included equipment given to the Sierra Leone Army by the United Kingdom.

The British Government would nevertheless be ready to conduct a thorough investigation of this matter. For that purpose, we would request that the Liberian authorities produce photographs and serial numbers of the cartridges in their possession. With these, my authorities will be able to trace the origin of the items and where they were destined. The United Kingdom is confident that it can account for all of the mortar bombs supplied to the Sierra Leone Army since May 2000.

(*Signed*) Steward **Eldon**
Chargé d'affaires

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Letter dated 22 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to the letter of 30 May 2001 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Canada, Ghana, India, Jordan, the Netherlands and New Zealand addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/535), I am pleased to provide herewith Pakistan's proposal for strengthening cooperation between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Shamshad **Ahmad**

01-42413 (E) 250601

Annex to the letter dated 22 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Concept paper on the core group

Introduction

1. This paper elaborates the essential elements of the core group concept proposed by Pakistan. The aim of this paper is not to supplant other proposals made for strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries by other Member States but to improve on them. To this extent, this paper acknowledges similar proposals, including that of Canada, and hopes to build upon some of the key elements therein.

2. The core group proposal is a mission-specific one and is aimed at strengthening and formalizing the three-way relationship between the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat in a meaningful and results-oriented way in order to enhance managerial efficiency and improve the operational effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Concept

i. The Security Council or the Secretary-General will authorize the Secretariat to begin the mission planning process.

ii. Once possible contributors of troop contingents are identified for a potential mission, the Secretariat will informally approach them to determine their interest in participating in the proposed mission.

iii. Those States potentially interested in participating in making troop contributions will be invited to participate in survey missions.

iv. Member States that decide to contribute contingents will be invited by the Secretariat to participate in the mission planning process and will also be involved in the preliminary work on discussing the mandate, concept of operations, rules of engagement, etc.

v. The Security Council will establish a peacekeeping operation and simultaneously authorize, under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, the creation of an ad hoc core group, involving all Member States providing troop contingents for that particular mission.

Consultations

i. Meetings will occur in the following three forms:

   (a) **Informal consultations**: which would be informal discussions between core group members, in the presence, if required, of the Secretariat.

   (b) **Formal meetings**: of the core group with the Secretariat and Security Council members present.

   (c) **Special private meetings of the Security Council**: under Article 44 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ii. Informal consultations will provide for the core group members an opportunity to discuss issues among themselves or with the Secretariat; the formal meetings will involve Security Council members and will be geared to evolving a written set of recommendations, which will then be discussed in the Security Council.

iii. Meetings, both informal or formal, will be held when considering a new mandate, renewal or modification or termination of the mandate, a significant or serious political, military or humanitarian development, a rapid deterioration of the security situation on the ground, withdrawal or scaling-down in the size of the operation, as well as the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building.

iv. Informal consultations will have no recommendatory authority. Such meetings could be called by any core group member or by the Secretariat in case a briefing is in order.

v. Informal consultations will be truly informal and interactive. Participation of non-core group member States may also be allowed on a case-by-case basis.

vi. Formal meetings will be held to ensure a comprehensive consideration of critical issues relating to that specific peacekeeping operation.

vii. The working methods of the formal core group meetings are as follows:

(a) The purpose of a formal meeting is to come up with a series of recommendations that would be submitted to the Security Council.

(b) Formal meetings can be called by either the President of the Security Council or by a core group member, but will be presided over by the President of the Council.

(c) The participants will include core group and the Security Council members and the Secretariat.

(d) The tone of the discussions, however, will be informal in nature so as to encourage maximum interaction and exchange of views.

(e) The Chairman would endeavour to channel the discussions towards a results-oriented outcome, not necessarily a consensus.

(f) The outcome of the meeting would be to provide the Secretariat and the Security Council, respectively, with a set of recommendations to be subsequently submitted to the Security Council for due consideration. The recommendations can even come in the form of various alternative options in the absence of a consensus.

(g) The recommendations of the formal core group meeting will be presented to the Security Council and the Council members would consider the recommendations and decide on merit which ones to include in its decision-making, including its resolutions or in its instructions to the Secretariat.

viii. Special meetings of the Security Council will take place when it is considering a mandate or a change in the mandate that authorizes the use of force. In accordance with Article 44 of the Charter, those States members of the core group whose troops will be likely to carry out the necessary use of force will

be invited to sit in the Council during its meetings, including the Council's informal consultations on the subject. Core group members will participate in the formulation of and negotiations on the draft resolution but they will not be allowed to table draft resolutions or participate in the vote in the Security Council.

Coordination

i. The core group will discuss and review all aspects of the peacekeeping operation from its inception to its termination.

ii. The core group will be kept informed by the Secretariat, especially through informal consultations, about the peacekeeping operation in all its aspects. Assessment meetings will be held between the core group and the Secretariat at the appropriate stages of each operation in order to factor core group thinking into operational planning.

iii. The Secretariat will ensure that the briefing provided to the core group will be at least identical to that which it provides the Security Council. Greater elaboration by the Secretariat on operational and security issues will, however, be expected.

iv. The Secretary-General will include information on his consultations with the core group in his reports to the Security Council and will undertake to take their recommendations into account when taking decisions on such operations.

v. While the Secretariat will provide its own recommendations based on its information from the field, these will be first reviewed by the core group before being acted upon by the Security Council.

Considerations

i. The Security Council would at all times retain the right to make decisions.

ii. The establishment of the core group will supplant any existing "groups of friends".

iii. The above concept, which is fully consistent with Articles 29, 43 and 44 of the Charter, also respects all articles under Chapter V of the Charter pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of the Security Council.

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Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 22 of its resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, the Security Council requested me to report to it on a regular basis on security conditions on the ground in Sierra Leone so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) could be kept under review. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and covers developments since my ninth report on UNAMSIL, dated 14 March 2001 (S/2001/228).

II. Political situation

Implementation of the Abuja agreement

2. During the reporting period, the two-track approach pursued by the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community has begun to bear fruit, and significant progress has been achieved in the Sierra Leone peace process. On 10 April 2001 the joint committee comprising the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations met in Abuja and decided to meet with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to review the implementation of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement of 10 November 2000 (S/2000/1091, annex). That review meeting took place in Abuja on 2 May 2001. The Government of Nigeria provided an aircraft to transport the RUF delegation. At the meeting, it was concluded that the ceasefire agreement had been largely observed, with the exception of some attacks by the Civil Defence Force (CDF) on RUF in the eastern part of the country. The Government of Sierra Leone was urged to exert the necessary control over CDF in order to avert future attacks that could jeopardize the peace process. The Government of Sierra Leone was also called upon to take steps to extend its authority throughout the country as UNAMSIL deployed. The meeting also resulted in a renewed commitment by the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF to remove all roadblocks in areas under their control. RUF also pledged to return, by 30 May 2001, all weapons and equipment it had seized from UNAMSIL and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

3. The meeting also led to an affirmation that CDF and RUF should disarm simultaneously. To that end, a joint committee on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration comprising UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would meet in Freetown on 15 May to develop a timetable and modalities for the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The meeting further called upon the fighting groups to release all abductees, in particular child combatants, and urged the two parties to create an atmosphere conducive to the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

4. In addressing some of the regional ramifications of the Sierra Leone conflict, the meeting agreed that RUF should withdraw all of its combatants from the Kambia district and that, subsequently, the Sierra Leone army would deploy there. The withdrawn RUF combatants would be disarmed and demobilized. For its part, the Government of Sierra Leone indicated that its army and police would be open to the recruitment of demobilized ex-combatants after careful screening.

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5. The Government of Sierra Leone also declared its preparedness to address some of the Front's political concerns, including releasing some detained RUF leaders, facilitating the transformation of RUF into a political party, and providing land or office space to the party in Freetown and in the provinces to enable it to meet the criteria for becoming a political party.

6. The results of the meeting in Abuja were endorsed by the RUF military leadership on 6 May. RUF also announced that it would no longer insist that the Sierra Leone army be included in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. For its part, the Government set up a high-ranking task force to oversee the implementation of the Abuja decisions.

Meetings of the joint committee

7. The above-mentioned joint committee met on 15 May at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown. It was the first high-level meeting between the Government, including CDF representatives, and RUF in Sierra Leone since the eruption of the crisis in May 2000. A second meeting of the joint committee was convened in Magburaka on 2 June, which was the first visit by government and CDF representatives to an area where RUF has a strong presence.

8. At the first meeting, the CDF and RUF leaders issued a joint communiqué in which they solemnly undertook to instruct their combatants to cease hostilities throughout the country forthwith. The parties agreed that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme should commence on 18 May with the simultaneous disarmament of RUF and CDF in the Kambia and Port Loko districts, and that the exercise should be completed on 28 May. Immediately thereafter, the Sierra Leone army would be deployed in the Kambia district to ensure the security of the border with Guinea.

9. At the second meeting of the committee, it was decided that the next stage of the disarmament process would be carried out simultaneously in the Kono and Bonthe districts during the month of June. Remaining CDF and RUF elements in the Port Loko district would be disarmed in Lunsar. The joint committee would meet again on 30 June to decide on a timetable for disarmament in all the remaining districts. The two parties agreed to form joint sensitization teams to promote a country-wide reconciliation process. RUF stated that it would begin to release child combatants and abductees on 25 May and to return weapons and equipment it had seized from ECOMOG and UNAMSIL on 30 May.

10. At the meetings of the joint committee, the RUF delegation reiterated its request to the Government to facilitate the registration of its political party and expressed the view that an interim government should be formed after the Government's mandate expired in September. RUF also expressed concern about reports that some of its detained members had died in custody. Initially, the Government representatives denied that there had been deaths of RUF members in custody. However, at the second meeting of the joint committee, the Government confirmed that 10 detainees, including 8 members of RUF, had died in prison during the period from May 2000 to May 2001. In view of the recent progress made in the peace process, the Government has set up a high-level committee to consider the release of some RUF detainees who would be required to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

11. Nearly all of the decisions taken at the meeting held on 2 May in Abuja and at the follow-up meeting on 15 May in Freetown have been implemented. The disarmament of RUF and CDF in the Kambia and Port Loko districts and the withdrawal of RUF from Kambia were completed on schedule. The Sierra Leone army started deploying to the Kambia district on 29 May and completed the deployment on 31 May. RUF released a total of 591 child combatants on 25 May and a further 178 on 4 June. The process of releasing more children is ongoing. The clashes between CDF and RUF in the Kono district were halted following intensive discussions between UNAMSIL leadership and the local commanders of the two groups, who agreed to begin immediate disarmament in the district.

12. However, on 30 May RUF handed over to UNAMSIL in Makeni only a negligible amount of assorted items, which included 10 weapons, some uniforms, beds, identity cards and 2 completely vandalized vehicles. UNAMSIL was informed that other vehicles in total disrepair were littering the road between Magburaka and Masingbi and that some armoured personnel carriers, stripped of their weapons, were located in the Kono and Kailahun districts. A few rifles belonging to UNAMSIL have been presented by combatants during the ongoing disarmament exercise.

UNAMSIL is continuing to press RUF to return all the seized weapons and equipment.

13. During several exchanges with UNAMSIL leadership, RUF members continued to express increasing concern about their security and political future. In particular, RUF leadership believed that many Sierra Leonean citizens were keeping arms that could be used against members of RUF. In that regard, they had received a report of harassment of RUF ex-combatants who had returned to their home communities. RUF also expressed apprehension about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. UNAMSIL is organizing information and sensitization meetings with RUF on the latter issues.

Regional aspects

14. During the period under review, ECOWAS leaders actively pursued their efforts to advance the peace process in Sierra Leone and to address the conflicts affecting the Mano River Union. On 11 April an extraordinary summit meeting of ECOWAS Heads of State was held in Abuja. Apart from its decisions on Sierra Leone, the summit called upon the Security Council to authorize and assist the deployment of the ECOMOG forces along the borders of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. It also set up a mediation committee, comprising the Presidents of Mali, Nigeria and Togo, to encourage dialogue between the Heads of State of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. An ECOWAS mission was sent to Liberia on 18 April to assess Liberia's compliance with the Security Council's demands contained in resolution 1343 (2001) of 7 March. My Special Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, maintained regular contacts with ECOWAS and with regional leaders to share information and to consult on ways of moving the Sierra Leone peace process forward and to address the conflicts in the Mano River Union.

15. On 18 May a serious incident took place in Rokupr on the first day of the disarmament exercise in the Kambia district when Guinean artillery fired several shells into that area. My Special Representative and President Kabbah travelled to Conakry on 19 May to discuss the incident of 18 May with the Guinean authorities, who apologized for the attack which they attributed to a decision by a local commander. They pledged to cooperate in ensuring that the disarmament exercise in the Kambia district would be successful. At a meeting at the Guinean border town of Pamelap on 3 June, President Kabbah and President Conté agreed to reopen the road linking Freetown and Conakry through the Kambia district.

III. Military and security situation

16. The overall military and security situation in Sierra Leone during March and April remained volatile, with reports of ceasefire violations by CDF, several of which were confirmed by UNAMSIL. The situation improved after the meeting in Abuja on 2 May. My Special Representative, the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande, and his Deputy Major General Martin Luther Agwai, paid several visits to the areas of clashes between CDF and RUF in the Kono district in an effort to bring the fighting to an end. On some occasions they were accompanied by senior government and CDF officials. As a result of those efforts, dialogue was opened between the CDF units that were apparently advancing on Koidu and RUF elements at that location, which resulted in an agreement by the two sides to begin disarmament in the Kono district. Following that agreement, RUF allowed the CDF combatants to come into Koidu, where they handed over their weapons to UNAMSIL. The combatants were subsequently entered into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in Daru.

17. On 8 June the Sierra Leone police, with the assistance of UNAMSIL, conducted a cordon and search operation in the Juba Hill area of Freetown in response to information that armed elements were planning to cause a disturbance in the city. During this operation, the police found a quantity of weapons and ammunition at the home of a senior officer in the Sierra Leone army, who was arrested with 38 other persons. The investigation into this case is ongoing.

Deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

18. Since my last report, the troop strength of UNAMSIL has increased to 12,718 (as at 21 June) with the arrival of a third battalion and support units from Bangladesh, the Ukraine Aviation Unit and the advance party of the Pakistani contingent (see annex). All 4,300

personnel from Pakistan are expected to be in the mission area by September 2001.

19. The build-up of the UNAMSIL military component has enabled the Mission to implement the second phase of its concept of operations and to prepare for the third phase. In keeping with that concept, UNAMSIL deployed in the areas of Lunsar, Makeni, Magburaka and Mano Junction between 7 and 23 April. Since 16 May, two companies from the Bangladeshi contingent have maintained a continuous patrol presence in Koidu, which is a major diamond-producing centre. This presence (which was established much earlier than was originally envisaged) has served as a confidence-building measure and has enabled UNAMSIL to build a more complete picture of the situation in this sensitive area.

20. In addition to these deployments, the robust patrolling that began during the first phase of the concept of operations has continued. Through these long-range patrols, UNAMSIL was able to establish a presence in the Kambia district prior to the commencement of the disarmament exercise in the area. United Nations patrols have also reached Kamakwie in the west, Kabala in the north and Kailahun, Buedu and Koidu in the east.

21. UNAMSIL is preparing to embark on the third phase of its concept of operations, which involves the deployment of United Nations troops into the diamond-producing regions and some border areas in the Eastern Province. With the arrival of the Pakistani contingent, a new sector will be established in the east by September.

22. United Nations military observers deployed to Makeni and Magburaka during the reporting period. They play a key role in the monitoring of the ceasefire and in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Military observers also act as liaison officers to Guinea and to the Sierra Leone army.

23. Looking ahead, UNAMSIL is currently assessing the deployment pattern that the force should adopt and the strength required in the possible fourth phase of the concept of operations. During the fourth phase, UNAMSIL would be expected to expand its presence across the entire country, inter alia, to provide support for elections. UNAMSIL would also build a strong rapid reaction capability. At this stage, however, it is not yet possible to assess whether this will require an increase in the Mission's authorized strength. However, it is expected that there would be progressive involvement of the Sierra Leone army, in close coordination with UNAMSIL, in maintaining security, in particular at the borders. This would also prepare the ground for a gradual handover of security responsibilities to the Sierra Leone police and army in due course, allowing for a phased drawdown of UNAMSIL at a later stage.

24. The army continued its training and restructuring programme, with the assistance of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The programme will soon include ex-combatants who have disarmed in the Kambia and Port Loko districts and have passed the screening test. In order to ensure a measure of impartiality and objectivity, the Government of Sierra Leone has invited UNAMSIL to participate in the screening of ex-combatants who wish to join the army. CDF and RUF will also be represented in the selection committee.

IV. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Disarmament and demobilization

25. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme was relaunched on 18 May in keeping with the decision taken at the meeting of the joint committee on 15 May. At that meeting, the parties agreed that, in addition to the already existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps at Port Loko, Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru, additional camps would be set up at Makeni, Lunsar, Kamakwie, Masingbi, Koidu, Pujehun and Bonthe. UNAMSIL would also operate mobile disarmament units. RUF ex-combatants would be encamped for a period of up to four weeks, while CDF combatants would stay in the camps for a shorter period. In the camps, ex-combatants would receive orientation briefings as well as briefings on opportunities available to them during the reintegration stage. The implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme would be monitored by a mechanism with the participation of CDF and RUF. In addition, CDF and RUF would be represented in all the technical bodies of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

26. During the meeting of the joint committee, held on 15 May, RUF declared that it had a total of 10,000 combatants throughout the country. CDF declared a total of 15,000 combatants, but indicated that that number could increase up to 20,000 because CDF cadres were volunteers rather than enlisted combatants. The two parties also declared the numbers and types of weapons in their possession.

27. In the Kambia and Port Loko districts, a total of 3,502 combatants (1,096 RUF and 2,406 CDF), were disarmed between 18 and 31 May. There were 184 child combatants from RUF and 123 from CDF. Since then disarmament has continued in Lunsar, where 249 RUF and 237 CDF ex-combatants disarmed. The total number of ex-combatants who have disarmed since 18 May stands at 5,669, of which 1,808 are from RUF and 3,861 from CDF. The number of weapons collected during that period is 2,991, with more than 150,000 rounds of assorted ammunition. It is worth noting that the weapons handed in by RUF in the Kambia district were of serviceable quality and included several heavy weapons.

28. During the disarmament exercise in the above-mentioned districts, the accommodation at the Port Loko disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp proved to be inadequate, resulting in overcrowding and water shortages. To overcome this problem, some CDF combatants had to be demobilized in their villages, while others had to be discharged early from the camp. Before their discharge, the ex-combatants were briefed by Sierra Leone army and police officials on the procedures and criteria for absorption into the army and police.

29. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued to organize support for child ex-combatants, while the World Food Programme (WFP) continued vital food support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites. In response to the acceleration of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, UNAMSIL has streamlined its internal organization to better cope with the demands on the Mission in this area. An integrated working group on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, comprising military and civilian components, meets regularly and interfaces with the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. At the same time, there may be a need for UNAMSIL to lend additional support to the Committee and to fill any crucial gaps, within its ability to ensure that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is brought to a successful conclusion.

Reintegration

30. The reintegration aspect of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is pivotal to the success of the entire programme. Without effective and adequate reintegration opportunities, the ex-combatants could resort to banditry or return to the bush. The cash benefits for the combatants have been reduced as a result of the abolition of payment of the transitional safety allowance. In the current exercise, upon demobilization each combatant receives only a small transport allowance, equivalent to about $15. The Government has proposed that, in future, it would provide ex-combatants with food supplies, some materials and cash to assist with shelter, food and health care. In total, this reinsertion package has a value of about $200, most of which would be provided only after ex-combatants register with a regional reintegration centre.

31. The Government has put into place a short-term reintegration programme for ex-combatants of six months' duration, which should start within three months after their demobilization. The opportunities available under this programme include a total of 3,055 available openings in vocational training, agriculture, apprenticeships, public works, child reintegration and dependant support. In preparation for the absorption of ex-combatants into the army, a temporary holding camp to accommodate potential recruits for both the army and the police has been established in Kabala.

32. However, there are still critical gaps in the reintegration programme, including the absence of a bridge between demobilization and reintegration, a shortage of resources for assistance beyond the short-term reintegration period, a lack of coordination with the military reintegration plan and weak linkages with parallel and bilaterally funded programmes in community reintegration. It should also be borne in mind that the short-term reintegration offered through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme does not guarantee longer-term employment or other income generation, which depends on a revival of the economy. Provision should be made, therefore, for the tracking of ex-combatants to ensure their successful integration into society and to prevent the formation of a disenfranchised group

that, as in the past, could present a threat to the stability of the country and the subregion. In this regard, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is working with the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation to create income-earning opportunities for ex-combatants in the Kambia district as well as to provide support for the tracking of ex-combatants.

33. UNAMSIL has received several indications from both CDF and RUF commanders and ex-combatants that they have no clear understanding regarding reintegration support for ex-combatants. It would be important for the Government, with the assistance of UNAMSIL, to step up sensitization and awareness campaigns for ex-combatants in order to avoid any unrealistic expectations and disappointments that could, as has happened before, lead to disturbances and instability.

34. On 11 and 12 June, the World Bank organized a donors' conference in Paris with the principal aim of generating financial support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme through the World Bank-managed multi-donor trust fund. At that conference, the Government, whose delegation included a high-ranking member of RUF, presented its strategy for the way ahead and, in particular, its plans for the short- and medium-term reintegration of ex-combatants. Currently, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has a funding shortfall of $17.5 million for 2001 and $13.9 million for 2002. It is expected that the Government may run out of resources for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme by August of this year. While no pledges were made at the conference, many delegations responded in a positive manner to reports of progress achieved on the ground and to the plans presented by the Government. I call upon donors to finalize their decision to contribute to this crucial endeavour as soon as possible, since the window of opportunity for a successful implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme remains relatively narrow and the pace of events could very soon outstrip the available resources. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, which is so vital for the success of the overall peace process, cannot be allowed to fail for lack of resources.

35. As part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, UNAMSIL has destroyed a total of 10,800 weapons collected from ex-combatants. Those weapons have been converted into agricultural and other tools. In addition, about 6,960 explosive items collected before 18 May 2001 have been destroyed.

V. Governance and stabilization

36. During the period under review, the Mission continued to enhance and strengthen its civilian presence and operations in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the progress achieved on the political and security fronts. To those ends, UNAMSIL has developed collaborative relationships and mechanisms with national and external partners. This coordination has proved especially important as the Mission's deployment has moved ahead and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has gained momentum, which provided opportunities for reintroducing basic services and facilities into areas previously inaccessible both to the Government and the humanitarian community.

Restoration of State authority

37. UNAMSIL continued to work with the Government on efforts to extend civil authority to all areas of the country, giving special attention to the restoration of basic public services in areas where UNAMSIL had recently deployed. United Nations civil affairs officers have thus been assigned to Lunsar, Makeni, Magburaka and Kambia to facilitate the return of government services, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. Since my last report, UNAMSIL has provided guidance and logistical support to surveys of government infrastructure and public services in several towns in the Northern Province. The joint participation of RUF and government representatives in those surveys has served to build trust and confidence between the two parties. In all cases, the surveys confirmed that most government infrastructure had been damaged and that most public services were non-existent. Similar surveys will be conducted in the Eastern Province following the further deployment of UNAMSIL.

38. With joint support from UNAMSIL, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP, it is expected that the Government will soon

present to its national and international partners the urgent requirements for humanitarian assistance as well as its priorities for the rehabilitation of its infrastructure. In the meantime, UNAMSIL has encouraged the Government to restart critical social services, especially health and education, in areas where it has recently deployed. Limited progress has been made with the reopening of clinics in Lunsar, the re-establishment of schools in Makeni and the distribution of seeds in the Northern Province, supported by UNICEF, WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. At the request of the Ministry of Education, UNAMSIL also facilitated the annual national primary school examination in Makeni, Magburaka, Bumbuna and Kabala, towns from which ministry officials had previously withdrawn. UNAMSIL is also supporting the reform and strengthening of district- and chiefdom-level administration throughout the country.

39. The restoration of a civilian police presence throughout the country is another critical element of governance and stabilization. During the period under review, UNAMSIL activities in this area have focused on assisting the Sierra Leonean police force in training new police recruits, providing advice on investigation methods, supporting the deployment of officers throughout the country and overseeing the construction or rehabilitation of police stations. United Nations civilian police advisers have been deployed to Makeni and Lunsar to assist in the planned deployment of the Sierra Leone police to the area. The advisers are collaborating with the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force on training activities. In the near future, I intend to review the role of United Nations civilian police advisers in the current environment in Sierra Leone and make recommendations to the Security Council in due course.

40. The Sierra Leone police have successfully deployed to Kambia. Plans are currently under way to deploy the police officers in Lunsar, Makeni and Magburaka. It should be noted that RUF is not placing any obstacles in the way of the deployment of the police and of health and education officials in the areas where it is present.

41. In spite of recent encouraging progress, the restoration of State authority still faces major challenges. Because of severe budgetary constraints, the Government has very limited capacity to respond to the massive needs for rehabilitation and basic services. Security concerns are still paramount in large parts of the country, and this has sometimes discouraged government officers from returning to their posts. Finally, a certain degree of inertia has led to delays in the extension of government services, including in areas already controlled by the Government. A key challenge that may soon present itself may be the extension of State authority and the maintenance of law and order in the diamond-producing areas. Sierra Leone will need sustained support and encouragement from the international community to successfully address these structural and capacity constraints.

Rehabilitation

42. For the rehabilitation of communities adversely affected by the war, the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone has provided direct support to UNAMSIL peace-building activities throughout the country. To date, the Trust Fund has provided assistance — often involving UNAMSIL force contingents — in rebuilding police stations, which are vital in maintaining fragile security, repairing social infrastructure such as schools, supporting victims of sexual violence and carrying out peace sensitization activities and human rights campaigns. As the peace process progresses with the deployment of UNAMSIL contingents, the Trust Fund is being redefined to focus on two windows of support to stabilization: (a) quick-impact programmes to support the restoration of government authority; and (b) first-line short-term support to the war-affected populations in areas of deployment. Contributions made so far to the Trust Fund are almost exhausted, and new resources will be required to support the renewed phase of the peace process. In addition to the Trust Fund, UNAMSIL negotiated an agreement with the Ministry of Health to have UNAMSIL force contingents distribute critical medicines to local populations that are not currently serviced by the Government.

VI. Elections

43. With the current progress in disarmament, it appears increasingly likely that the Government will be able to organize elections during the next dry season (October 2001 to May 2002). Presently, it envisages doing so in December of this year. Based on this target

date, the National Electoral Commission has completed its pre-electoral preparations, including drawing up a strategic plan, the timetable and the election budget. The Commission is receiving most of its technical assistance from the Commonwealth and the International Foundation for Election Systems. The Commission has consulted governmental, traditional, political and civic organizations on the choice of the electoral system to be adopted in the upcoming elections. A great majority of the Sierra Leonean public appears to support a single-member constituency system, which would have major technical, financial and operational consequences that would also affect the time needed for the preparation of the elections.

44. It is envisaged that the next phase of electoral preparations would include a three-month intensive civic education campaign designed to inform, educate and raise the awareness of the electorate, which will commence in July. This would be immediately followed by a nationwide registration of the country's estimated 2.7 million potential voters. The registration process will involve the registration of eligible Sierra Leoneans, the exhibition of the provisional voters' register, the hearing of claims and objections arising from the exhibition and the printing of the final voters' register. The following crucial phase, leading up to the holding of elections, would include the nomination of candidates, the political campaign and the preparation of electoral materials. This phase will require increased assistance by UNAMSIL.

45. To prepare for the involvement of the United Nations in the elections, the Secretariat sent an assessment mission to Sierra Leone in May 2001 to review with the National Electoral Commission, UNAMSIL and other partners the nature and timing of the support that may be required from the United Nations. To date, UNAMSIL has provided assistance for the coordination of international support to the elections. UNDP has already initiated action to mobilize funding and logistical support from external partners. Bilateral donors have already pledged a significant amount of the needed financial resources.

46. On 10 June, the National Electoral Commission, in a letter addressed to my Special Representative, requested United Nations technical and logistical assistance in support of the elections. Such assistance would include the provision of a team to observe the electoral process, transport and communication assets and security throughout the process. In accordance with the mandate of UNAMSIL under resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999, I intend to respond positively to this request.

47. In addition to the areas of support indicated in the previous paragraph, it is my expectation that the Mission's public information capabilities could also play a significant role in support of the electoral process. Any support provided by UNAMSIL in the elections would obviously require additional resources, including the gradual increase of its electoral capacity in accordance with the phases described above. In this regard, I intend to make more specific recommendations to the Security Council as soon as possible on the basis of a well-prepared electoral plan. At present, it would be my intention to establish a small electoral unit in UNAMSIL that would be expanded gradually in accordance with the progress made in the electoral preparations.

48. In principle, the monitoring of the process should begin as soon as electoral preparations begin throughout the country and should involve a broad range of actors and international organizations, including the Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS.

49. Obviously, several key conditions need to be met before elections can be held effectively and in an atmosphere that is free of violence and intimidation: the full disarmament of RUF and CDF, the deployment of UNAMSIL and, in some areas, of the Sierra Leone army, to provide security throughout the country; the accessibility of most if not all parts of the country for voter registration and civic education; and the adoption of measures to receive internally displaced persons and Sierra Leonean refugees. In addition, members of RUF who have disarmed and demobilized should be allowed to participate in the political life of the country. Therefore, I encourage the Government to provide further assistance to facilitate the transformation of RUF to a political party.

VII. Public information

50. UNAMSIL continued to enhance its capacity to disseminate information designed to promote the peace process and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and to improve public understanding of UNAMSIL and the United Nations. UNAMSIL conducted sensitization meetings with the

local communities, including youth groups, women's organizations, ex-combatants and journalists, and is utilizing local comedians, artists and television for public outreach campaigns. It has organized two successful public events: a nationwide Women's March for Peace and the first musical concert in more than a decade in Makeni, featuring one of Sierra Leone's most popular pop stars. The concert was attended by several high-level government officials. A nationwide tour of a stage play on reconciliation has started recently.

51. Radio UNAMSIL has expanded its reach in the country and the subregion by broadcasting on short-wave as well as FM frequencies. Efforts are under way to set up transmitters in Magburaka and Bo that would extend the reach of Radio UNAMSIL to most of the country. A training course for local journalists will be held in late June.

VIII. Human rights

52. In spite of recent progress, the situation of internally displaced persons and returnees in Sierra Leone continues to be a major cause of concern. Reports from internally displaced persons and returnees indicate that, until recently, armed groups have committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law against the civilian population in Sierra Leone, including rape and the destruction of homes. These allegedly occurred while Guinean forces were in pursuit of RUF combatants who had carried out operations in Guinea. UNAMSIL and human rights non-governmental organizations have been able to document some violations committed in the Kambia district. There have also been reports of villages being attacked from the air, causing large-scale civilian casualties.

53. However, the recent deployment of UNAMSIL troops in Makeni and Magburaka, as well as the disarmament in the Kambia and Port Loko districts, has enabled some internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Human rights officers have begun to undertake visits to Lunsar and Magburaka. UNAMSIL plans to carry out regular human rights monitoring visits to all areas in which it is deployed. On 2 May UNAMSIL opened a human rights office in Kenema. It plans to open additional offices in other regions as well.

54. A group of 23 Guinean refugees was repatriated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on 12 May after escaping from RUF custody in Kailahun. An additional 24 Guineans were released in early June, while many others are alleged to be held by RUF in or near Kailahun. They are said to have been captured during RUF raids into Guinea. Interviews with those who were released indicate that many of them suffered human rights abuses, including rape. UNAMSIL and UNHCR are collaborating in efforts to locate them and secure their release.

55. About 265 suspected detainees, including 10 women, have been held in custody by the Government without being charged or having access to legal counsel since May 2000. Since September, UNAMSIL has been granted permission to pay visits to the Freetown Central Prison on the condition that all discussions with detainees are held in the presence of prison officials. However, since 14 March, when some detainees rioted at the prison, access has been curtailed. Some detainees have been moved to safer, undisclosed locations. Following pressure by UNAMSIL, the Government allowed visits to resume on 7 June.

Protection of children

56. During the reporting period, close to 1,000 abducted and separated children have been released. A large majority (over 870) of them were released by RUF. The released children are now in the care of child-protection agencies. RUF has established a regional committee on the release of child combatants that liaises directly with UNAMSIL and the child-protection agencies in the area. Family reunification has been relatively successful. UNAMSIL, through its public information facilities and initiatives in civil affairs, is ensuring that information and messages about the reunification and reintegration of children reach all sectors of the community.

IX. Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court

57. Some progress is being achieved with regard to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. My Special Representative and the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have agreed on a detailed programme of support for the Commission's preparatory phase. The raising of the necessary funds for the Commission is now a priority, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has agreed to coordinate this effort.

58. My Special Representative, as selection coordinator, has received 59 nominations for the 4 positions of national commissioners for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At the international level, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also made progress in identifying suitable candidates. Within Sierra Leone, the nomination process, which has been given widespread publicity, has itself assisted in increasing public awareness about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Considerable effort is being made to ensure Sierra Leonean ownership of the process and to include traditional structures and methods of reconciliation. There is a high degree of support for the Commission among Sierra Leoneans who are aware of the institution and its role. The preparations for the Commission must be expedited to the maximum extent possible.

59. UNAMSIL also works with the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney-General's Office on the restoration of local courts in the Northern Province and also sensitizes members of RUF and CDF, ex-combatants and local populations about the goals and procedures of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In addition, UNAMSIL organizes face-to-face reconciliation dialogues between RUF representatives and the paramount chiefs and encourages public works programmes to enable ex-combatants to work with local populations in rebuilding their shared communities.

60. The Secretariat has continued its discussions with interested Member States with regard to the financing of the Special Court. It is currently estimated that the Special Court would require about $57 million in voluntary funding for the first three years. To date, donors have pledged about $34 million. In this regard, I appeal to donors to make additional contributions so that the Special Court can be established.

X. Humanitarian aspects

61. A key feature of the period under review has been improved access across the country. The deployment of UNAMSIL peacekeepers to Lunsar, Makeni and Kambia and patrols in the Kono area, together with the progress in disarmament, have opened up new areas of the country to humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian agencies and organizations are now operational in all of these areas, and an expansion of activities is planned. Refugees continue to return to Sierra Leone over land and sea, many of whom have returned to RUF-controlled areas. The situation with regard to refugees and internally displaced persons is described in more detail in my report of 23 May 2001 (S/2001/513).

62. The deployment of Sierra Leone army to the border with Guinea in the Kambia district has improved the security situation there and could assist in creating conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. However, much needs to be done before the former inhabitants of that district can return. Most of the infrastructure and basic services in the district are missing or have been destroyed. Also, the Governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone have yet to establish immigration and customs services at the border crossings. Meanwhile, UNHCR has established a presence in Kambia.

63. The longer-term reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration will require considerable support. I call upon donor countries to adopt a flexible approach and to sustain their support to Sierra Leone as the security environment improves and the need for longer-term community recovery increases by contributing to the ongoing consolidated appeals process and by further supporting development agencies.

64. With the rapid developments taking place in Sierra Leone and in neighbouring countries, effective coordination is of high importance. Within the Government, the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation is a key policy forum for the rehabilitation of the country. Within the United Nations family, the new institutional arrangements whereby my Deputy Special Representative for Governance and Stabilization also serves as Humanitarian Coordinator have significantly contributed to stronger links between UNAMSIL, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance.

XI. Economic developments

65. Recent progress in the peace process and the improvement of the security situation have helped to improve the economic situation in the country. Inflation has remained under control, and the trade balance and foreign exchange reserves have strengthened. The ready availability of foreign exchange resulted in the appreciation of the local currency against the United States dollar. The recovery was facilitated by prudent macroeconomic policies that the Government continued to implement.

66. Notwithstanding these positive developments, the country's overall economic and financial situation remains very difficult. It has been crippled by 10 years of civil conflict, and poverty remains endemic and pervasive. Export growth has not kept pace with imports. Agricultural output continued its upward, albeit slow trend, but major producing areas remained inaccessible. Rutile and bauxite mines, which represent a significant source of income, are still non-operational. Meanwhile, importation has sharply increased, with the resumption of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The country's internal and especially external debt remains a very onerous burden on its economy. The debt service to export ratio is estimated at 55 per cent for the year 2000. It is hoped that Sierra Leone will be able to access debt relief under the enhanced heavily indebted poor countries initiative.

67. In response to these challenges, the Government has developed, with the Bretton Woods institutions, a two-phase approach to its poverty-reduction strategy. During a transitional period from 2001 to 2002, efforts will be focused on strengthening the peace process, meeting the immediate needs of the displaced population and ex-combatants, rehabilitating the economic and social infrastructures and building capacity in the public services. A longer-term strategy of reform will build on ongoing structural reforms, including the strengthening of the banking system, the promotion of the private sector and the reform of the public enterprise sector.

XII. Consultations with troop-contributing countries

68. During the period under review, the Secretariat continued its bilateral discussions and consultations with troop contributors on a range of operational and administrative issues. In particular, it held several consultations with contributors whose troops are experiencing serious shortfalls in equipment and self-sustainment capabilities. As a result of those discussions, the Secretariat and the Member States involved are exploring alternatives to the current support arrangements for affected contingents. The Secretariat has also continued its discussions with prospective troop contributors that could contribute additional personnel to UNAMSIL in case the Security Council decides to further increase its authorized military strength.

69. On 22 May troop and police contributors received a briefing from the Secretariat on developments in Sierra Leone. On that occasion, troop contributors welcomed the positive developments in the peace process, underscored the need to address the tension between the Mano River Union countries and expressed their support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as well as for the activities of the UNAMSIL civilian police.

XIII. Observations

70. The positive developments in Sierra Leone over the past two months constitute grounds for cautious optimism that Sierra Leone, with the assistance of the international community, is turning a page and is now embarking on a course that could lead to long-awaited peace. I call upon the leadership of RUF, as well as the Government of Sierra Leone, to continue to work resolutely and in good faith towards that end.

71. Despite this positive outlook, however, many challenges remain, and considerable efforts need to be made to maintain the recently achieved momentum. In particular, the United Nations must remain vigilant and continue its efforts to establish security throughout the country. In that regard, UNAMSIL will continue its forward deployment, in particular to the key diamond-producing areas in the east of the country, as well as its robust patrols to all areas, including towards the borders with Guinea and Liberia.

72. While the progress achieved in Sierra Leone is encouraging, the security situation in the subregion remains difficult. I reiterate my call upon the leaders of the Mano River Union countries to start, without delay, a political dialogue that would have as its principal objective the restoration of security and stability in the subregion. This would also allow the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people and refugees to return to their places of origin and resume their lives in peace.

73. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme remains crucial to all aspects of the Sierra Leonean peace process, including the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections throughout the country. Therefore, in the coming months, the Government and its international partners should concentrate their efforts on the effective implementation of that programme. UNAMSIL stands ready, within its capabilities, to provide assistance to the Government in order to expedite and maintain the momentum of the programme.

74. There is a serious risk that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme will soon stall as a result of insufficient funding. I therefore call upon the international community to contribute urgently and generously to the trust fund for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme managed by the World Bank. However, should voluntary funding not be forthcoming in time or in sufficient amounts, it would then be necessary to consider, on an urgent basis, alternative funding mechanisms to enable the programme to continue.

75. The most urgent tasks that need to be addressed in the short term include the early establishment of adequate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration facilities and the development of a realistic timetable for implementing the programme in the remaining districts and for the timely creation of reintegration opportunities. The reinsertion of ex-combatants into their communities will require particular and sustained attention in the broader context of the reintegration of war-affected populations and the overall economic recovery of the country. The social reintegration of senior and mid-level RUF commanders may require flexible solutions, for example through dedicated educational programmes in Sierra Leone or aboard.

76. As more communities in Sierra Leone start receiving demobilized ex-combatants, there will be a need to exercise tolerance and forgiveness to start the process of reconciliation and national healing. This should be a country-wide process, which will require the encouragement and support of the international community. For their part, many Sierra Leoneans wish to see the restoration, as early as possible, of normalcy and peace to their communities through national reconciliation. In that regard, I believe that the efforts by the United Nations and the Sierra Leonean Government to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be accelerated. I am also pleased to note that some progress has been made in the preparations for the Special Court.

77. The forward deployment of UNAMSIL and the progress made in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are expected to open up large parts of the country. It is important for the Government to seize this opportunity and extend State administration and basic services throughout Sierra Leone in an effective and transparent manner. The Government should also expedite, along with its national and international partners, planning for long-term recovery and rehabilitation.

78. In the months ahead, once UNAMSIL has deployed further, the establishment of State authority and law and order in the diamond-producing areas will be a particular challenge. I urge the Government to give this issue its full attention in order to avoid the serious consequences that could result from a possible surge in uncontrolled diamond mining.

79. UNAMSIL, in particular its civilian police component, could play an enhanced role in providing training and advice to Sierra Leonean law enforcement officials, in cooperation with the team of Commonwealth police advisers. To that end, I intend to bring the civilian police component of UNAMSIL to its authorized strength of 60 civilian police advisers as soon as possible and to assess whether there is a need to further expand the United Nations role in that regard.

80. If the pace of implementation of the Abuja Agreement is maintained, it is likely that the dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF will increasingly focus on political issues. The United Nations, in coordination with ECOWAS, stands ready to help the parties in that process. The Government has

already extended some assistance to RUF to help transform it into a political party so that it can participate in the next elections. For its part, RUF should expedite this transformation through full disarmament and active participation in national and local mechanisms for reconciliation, as well as by taking urgent steps to complete the administrative procedure to establish itself as a political party. In that regard, there may be a need for international assistance for all registered parties in Sierra Leone in order to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections.

81. The Government has requested, through the National Electoral Commission, the support of the United Nations in the electoral process. Preparations are under way, in accordance with the UNAMSIL mandate, to provide such support, as described in section VI above.

82. In the light of the progress achieved on the ground, I am assessing what deployment pattern UNAMSIL should adopt and the overall military strength that may be required in the next phases, which will involve deployment throughout the country and, subsequently, support for the holding of free and fair elections. As indicated in previous reports, this may require a further temporary increase of the Mission's military strength. I intend to make detailed recommendations regarding its strength and tasks in support of the peace process and the elections, based on a realistic electoral plan, in my next report.

83. I am very conscious that support for the peace process in Sierra Leone places a heavy financial burden on the international community. In addition to financing UNAMSIL through assessed contributions, Governments are also asked to make voluntary contributions for a whole range of activities, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Special Court, the preparation and organization of elections and humanitarian assistance, as well as the long-term development and economic recovery of the country. I hope, therefore, that the Sierra Leonean people will make the best possible use of the current unique opportunity created by the international community's significant investments.

84. In conclusion, I should like to commend the parties, ECOWAS, my Special Representative, Mr. Adeniji, and the UNAMSIL military and civilian personnel of UNAMSIL for the progress accomplished during the period under review. I would also like to express my appreciation to the countries contributing troops to this very important mission.

Annex

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 21 June 2001

Contributor	*Military observers*	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Sector headquarters staff*	*Total*
Bangladesh	12	18	4 183	65	4 278
Bolivia	6				6
Canada	5				5
China	6				6
Croatia	10				10
Czech Republic	5				5
Denmark	2				2
Egypt	10				10
France	1				1
Gambia	26				26
Ghana	4	11	796	58	869
Guinea	12	5	772		789
Indonesia	10				10
Jordan	10	2	118		130
Kenya	11	17	992	64	1 084
Kyrgyzstan	2				2
Malaysia	10				10
Mali	8				8
Nepal	6				6
New Zealand	2				2
Nigeria	4	24	3 232	4	3 264
Pakistan	10	13	515		538
Russian Federation	16	4	109		129
Slovakia	2				2
Sweden	3				3
United Republic of Tanzania	11				11
Thailand	5				5
Ukraine		5	628		633
United Kingdom	16	8			24
Uruguay	11				11
Zambia	10	6	818	5	839
Total	**246**	**113**	**12 163**	**196**	**12 718**

Authorized strength: Military 17,500 (up to 260 military observers); civilian police 60.

Civilian police component: Bangladesh 4; Gambia 2; Ghana 3; India 1; Jordan 3; Kenya 3; Malaysia 3; Nepal 5; Norway 2; Senegal 5; Zimbabwe 2. Total: 33.



Map No. 4132 Rev. 11 UNITED NATIONS
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United Nations A/55/993–S/2001/628

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 64
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 19 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 18 June 2001 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Umit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-42704 (E) 280601

Annex to the letter dated 19 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 8 May 2001 (A/55/932-S/2001/457) addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations, and bring to your kind attention the following:

The above-mentioned letter is an attempt by the Greek Cypriot administration to mislead world public opinion on the sentencing of Panicos Tziakourmas in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot administration, under the usurped title of "government of Cyprus", has tried to interfere with the independent judicial process in Northern Cyprus. As in all democratic States, the State structure of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is characterized by a strict separation of powers, enabling the judiciary to be independent from the other organs of the State. Thus, interference in the decisions taken by the judiciary is neither feasible nor acceptable.

Mr. Tziakourmas was arrested on 12 December 2000 by the Turkish Cypriot police near the village of Beyarmudu within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on suspicion of dealing in narcotics and was found in possession of illegal drugs. Upon his arrest he was treated with the necessary care and respect under the laws of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He was tried, found guilty and sentenced, on 26 April 2001, to six months in jail by the Gazi Mağusa Assize Court. He was subsequently released on the basis of time already served and good conduct.

It is ironic that the Greek Cypriot administration is trying to defame the Turkish Cypriot side while its police have made a career out of abducting Turkish Cypriots from the buffer zone and torturing them, a fact also confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights which, in December 2000, found the Greek Cypriot administration guilty of torturing Erkan Eğmez, a Turkish Cypriot citizen who was abducted by the Greek Cypriot police in the buffer zone in 1995. Another recent case of abduction of a Turkish Cypriot by the Greek Cypriot police is that of Ömer Tekoğul, who lives in the mixed village of Pyla, situated in the United Nations-controlled buffer zone. This incident is clearly a case of abduction, since it occurred within the United Nations-controlled buffer zone, where the Greek Cypriot police have no jurisdiction. It is regrettable that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has chosen to remain silent in an abduction case that occurred in an area under its control. This has inevitably resulted in the sentencing of an innocent Turkish Cypriot by the "justice" system of the Greek Cypriot regime, which has never served justice to any Turkish Cypriot. This unacceptable stance of UNFICYP not only shook the confidence of the Turkish Cypriot people in the peacekeeping force, but also demonstrated that the Greek Cypriot police can get away with abduction. We ask that UNFICYP take urgent action to secure the release of Mr. Tekoğul.

The attempt by the Greek Cypriot representative to portray the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as "occupied areas" or as a "local administration" is an attempt to hide the fact that the only occupation in Cyprus is the 38-year-old occupation by the Greek Cypriots of the seat of the Government of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus. As is well known, the armed attacks against the

Turkish Cypriots in 1963 by Greek Cypriots left the Turkish Cypriot people stateless and eventually led to the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. The lawful presence of the Turkish military in Northern Cyprus is based on the 1960 treaties and on the full consent of the Turkish Cypriot people. It is important to note that the Turkish military presence in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a vital security requirement for the Turkish Cypriot people, as it serves as an effective deterrent against Greek Cypriot-Greek aggression in Cyprus.

I would like to underline the fact that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a sovereign and independent State, established by the Turkish Cypriot people through the exercise of their inherent right to self-determination. The Greek Cypriot administration, which persecutes people on the basis of ethnicity, has no right at all to talk about human rights or to question the integrity of the judicial system in Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/ES-10/92–S/2001/629

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 25 June 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, continues with its bloody military campaign against the Palestinian people, which began on 28 September 2000, in spite of its declaration concerning the ceasefire. Yesterday, Israel committed another war crime by assassinating Mr. Osama Fathi Al-Jawabra while he stood in a public telephone booth in the city of Nablus. Apparently, the telephone booth was booby-trapped, a method that has been used before by the Israeli occupying forces in committing such crimes against Palestinian civilians. In actuality, since 23 May 2001, the date of the Israeli declaration of the ceasefire, Israeli occupying forces have brutally killed 25 Palestinian civilians, including 4 Palestinians since my last letter to you, dated 18 June 2001 (A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605). These additional killings bring the total number of Palestinian civilians killed to 505 (see annex). In addition, the number of Palestinian civilians seriously injured as a result of the excessive use of force by the Israeli occupying forces and the perpetual violence by Israeli settlers continues to rise. This bloody military campaign, including Israeli war crimes and Israeli State terrorism, must be brought to an end, and the international community must bear its responsibility in this regard.

Moreover, Israel is also trying to destroy the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) through the invention of the notion of "separate stages" of implementation, as well as its refusal to implement some basic recommendations such as the full cessation of settlement activity. By doing so, Israel, the occupying Power, is effectively undermining the true chance of ending the current tragic situation on the ground and resuming peace negotiations.

Furthermore, I would also like to refer to the recent letters from the Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, which contain references to incidents against Israelis. These letters attempt to present those incidents as if they took place inside of Israel against Israeli civilians, where in fact they took place in the Occupied Palestinian Territory against Israeli colonialist settlers. Those Israeli settlers have been illegally transferred by the

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occupying Power to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, in grave breach of various instruments of international humanitarian law and in total violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and other United Nations resolutions. Moreover, Israeli settlers have been engaged in a daily terror campaign against the Palestinian civilian population during which they have shot civilians, blocked roads, burned orchards, destroyed infrastructures and have committed a wide range of other atrocities. Actions of those settlers and their own safety remain the responsibility of the occupying Power.

The Palestinian side remains fully committed to the full implementation of the recommendations of the Mitchell Report, and in this context remains committed to the Tenet work plan of the security aspect of the recommendations. What is immediately needed now is the complete timeline of the implementation of all the recommendations as a package consistent with the letter and spirit of the Report.

In closing, I am writing this letter in follow-up to my previous 51 letters addressed to you regarding this grave and ongoing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 18 June 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; and A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605).

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 25 June 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. Tuesday, 19 June, through Sunday, 24 June 2001*

Tuesday, 19 June 2001

Fatma El'yan Abu Farwah

Wednesday, 20 June 2001

Jamal Nafe'

Saturday, 23 June 2001

Muhamad Jamal Sewedan (18 years old)

Sunday, 24 June 2001

Osama Fathi Al-Jawabra

* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 505.

United Nations A/55/995–S/2001/630

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 40
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 25 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters on the same subject, I have the honour to convey to you hereunder a list of the violations that were committed by Israel against Lebanon in the period from 17 to 24 June 2001. Lebanon regards these incidents as an extension of Israel's aggression against its people and territory.

17 June 2001

At 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas.

Between 2000 and 2035 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

Between 2045 and 2100 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched three illumination flares over the surrounding area.

18 June 2001

Between 1125 and 1155 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 2055 and 2250 hours there were six unexplained explosions in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

Between 2115 and 2210 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

Between 2320 and 2350 hours Israeli enemy forces at one of the outposts in the Ayn al-Tinah area in the occupied Shab`a farmlands fired several shells of miscellaneous calibre that impacted in the farmlands area and in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.

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19 June 2001

Between 0100 and 0345 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched two illumination flares over the surrounding area.

Between 0600 and 0615 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Ruwaysat al-Summaqah and Ruwaysat al-Alam outposts in the occupied Shab`a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at surrounding areas.

Between 1100 and 1500 hours Israeli enemy forces were engaged in maintenance work on the barbed-wire strip around Birkat al-Naqqar in the occupied Shab`a farmlands. They were supported by a patrol consisting of two HMMWV ("Hummer") vehicles, a tank and 12 personnel.

Between 2315 and 2515 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun and light-weapons fire at surrounding areas.

20 June 2001

Between 1200 and 1800 hours an Israeli bulldozer was engaged in excavation work along the Mazra`at Fashkul road in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

At 2315 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched an illumination flare and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at surrounding areas.

21 June 2001

Between 1400 and 1830 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Fatimah Gate were engaged in repairing the barbed-wire strip.

At 2250 hours Israeli forces at an outpost in the occupied Shab`a farmlands fired several 120-mm mortar rounds at the Birkat al-Naqqar vicinity in the farmlands area.

22 June 2001

Between 1105 and 1210 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

During the day it was noticed that teams of workers were engaged in constructing dwellings in the occupied Lebanese section.

23 June 2001

Between 0030 and 0035 hours Israeli forces at one of the outposts in the occupied Shab`a farmlands launched an illumination flare and fired two 120-mm mortar rounds that impacted in the vicinity of the Radar hill outpost in the same area.

Between 1035 and 1145 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Bekaa, the North and Mount Lebanon at various altitudes, breaking the sound barrier. They were engaged by Resistance anti-aircraft artillery in outlying areas of Tiri and Ayn Ibl.

At 1930 hours Israeli forces at the Radar hill outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at the surrounding area.

At 2110 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched an illumination flare over the surrounding area.

24 June 2001

Between 1100 and 1205 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Bekaa, the Shuf and the South at various altitudes.

At intervals between 1905 and 2240 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

At 2130 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of occupied Palestine off Ra's al-Naqurah launched two illumination flares over the surrounding area.

At 2320 hours Israeli forces at one of the outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands fired an unidentified projectile of unknown calibre that impacted in the farmlands area.

Like the previous Israeli violations of which it represents a continuation, this latest series is in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and of Lebanon's sovereignty and poses a threat to stability in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sélim **Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/631

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 25 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that Ambassador Hussein Hassouna, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, be allowed to participate without the right to vote in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council in the Council's discussion of the item currently on its agenda, "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait".

(*Signed*) Noureddine **Mejdoub**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-42726 (E) 260601

United Nations S/2001/632

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 25 June 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 3 May 2001 (S/PRST/2001/13), in which the Security Council requested me to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a final period of three months, and that it submit to the Council, through me, an addendum to its final report.

I wish to inform you that it is my intention to appoint Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt) as Chairperson of the Panel. Mr. Kassem, who previously served as Chairman of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), and recently on the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan, is an eminent person whose experience amply qualifies him to occupy this important position.

Subject to the approval of the Security Council, the Chairperson and members of the Panel would briefly convene in New York before proceeding to the region. The Panel would then submit through me, after three months, the addendum to the final report containing its findings.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-42806 (E) 260601

United Nations S/2001/633

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 26 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you the joint communiqué of the fifth consultative meeting of the Ministers for Defence of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Burundi (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daudi N. **Mwakawago**
Ambassador

01-42818 (E) 260601

Annex to the letter dated 26 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint communiqué of the fifth consultative meeting of the Ministers for Defence of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Burundi

1. The Ministers for Defence of the United Republic of Tanzania and of the Republic of Burundi, the Hon. Professor Philemon Sarungi, MP, and Colonel Cyrille Ndayirukiye, respectively, held their fifth meeting at the Sea Cliff Hotel in Dar es Salaam on 23 and 24 June 2001.

2. The Deputy Minister for Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Hon. John Chiligati, MP, and the Regional Commissioner of Kigoma, the Hon. Abubakar Y. Mgumia, together with Ambassador Emmanuel Rwamibango, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Embassy of Burundi in Dar es Salaam, also took part in the discussions.

3. The Ministers noted that security along the common border has not improved, in spite of the strong political will which exists between the two countries, as expressed during their last meeting held in Bujumbura. The two sides noted with serious concern and condemned the perpetration of illegal movements and criminal activities on the common border and reiterated the need to exchange timely information on the same so as to facilitate necessary actions.

4. The Ministers were briefed on the developments that have taken place along the common border since their last meeting, held in Bujumbura in February 2001. The two Ministers directed the leadership at the local level of the two countries to meet frequently to solve the problem of cross-border crimes, including theft of cattle and banditry.

5. With regard to stolen property intercepted, the Ministers agreed that such property should not be sold but should be returned to the country of origin expeditiously and the collaborators arrested.

6. Concerning the repatriation of refugees the two Ministers have commended the signing of the Tripartite Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi and UNHCR last May in accordance with the relevant recommendation of the fourth consultative meeting, held in Bujumbura in February 2001. The Ministers have directed that the meeting of the Technical Working Group be held in early July in Kigoma as scheduled, so as to put in place the operational plan for the repatriation of refugees and propose any other measures conducive to facilitating and speeding up the repatriation exercise, including the creation of safe zones in Burundi.

7. The two Ministers also made it categorically clear that, contrary to allegations being perpetrated in the media, there are no hostilities existing between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Burundi.

8. The discussions between the Ministers for Defence of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Burundi were conducted in an atmosphere of

frankness and cordiality, characterizing the good relations which exist between the two countries.

9. The two Ministers agreed that the next meeting would be held in Bujumbura in September 2001 on a date to be communicated through diplomatic channels.

10. Colonel Cyrille Ndayirukiye expressed his heartfelt and sincere gratitude to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania and to Professor Philemon Sarungi for the brotherly warm welcome and hospitality extended to his delegation during its stay in Tanzania.

Done at Dar es Salaam on the 24th day of June 2001.

(*Signed*) Philemon **Sarungi**
Minister for Defence and National Service of the
United Republic of Tanzania

(*Signed*) Cyrille **Ndayirukiye**
Minister for National Defence of the Republic of Burundi

United Nations S/2001/634

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 26 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit, annexed hereto, the statement by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning the upsurge in violence in Rwanda and Burundi.

I should be grateful if you would bring the text of this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council and circulate them as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Atoki **Ileka**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-42812 (E) 260601 260601

Annex to the letter dated 26 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning the upsurge in violence in Rwanda and Burundi

The last several weeks have seen a resurgence of violence in Rwanda and Burundi. At the same time, persistent reports, widely carried by the media, are circulating in diplomatic milieux and among some members of the international community.

These reports, which are said to come from Rwandan and Burundian governmental sources, attribute the upsurge to infiltrations from Congolese territory of Interahamwe and ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises forces and even Burundian rebels in these two countries. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are alleged to be facilitating these infiltrations, to the point where some characterize this as exporting the war to Rwanda and Burundi.

In view of the seriousness of the accusations made against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the emotional weight which they carry, the Government cannot remain passive and is compelled to react.

The Government regards these accusations as completely baseless and as the product of a genuine diversionary tactic.

First, the Government wishes to reaffirm that since the inauguration of Major-General Joseph Kabila as President of the Republic, it has maintained a consistent stance in favour of the peace process. The Government is endeavouring in a completely transparent way to remove all of the aggressors' pretexts for occupying its territory, particularly that of insecurity, which is regularly invoked by the aggressors, specifically, by Rwanda. For this reason, the Government points out that even though the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been subject to aggression, in flagrant violation of international law, it reaffirms its readiness to settle the conflict between it and the three aggressor countries in a peaceful and lasting way.

The Government's good faith in this regard has been reflected in the holding of two summit meetings between President Kabila and President Buyoya in Libreville under the auspices of President Bongo. These meetings made it possible for direct negotiations to begin between President Buyoya and Jean Bosco, leader of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD).

Well before this, two other meetings were also held between President Kabila and President Kagame, the first in Washington and the second in Arusha.

The contacts established recently at the highest level testify to the complete readiness of President Joseph Kabila to meet his Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian counterparts in order to discuss the withdrawal of their troops from Congolese territory and the pacification of the region. This is the spirit in which the Congolese President is preparing for his forthcoming meeting with the Ugandan President.

These efforts are in line with the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Security Council and the Political Committee of the Implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

Second, the Government is so attached to the principles of inviolability of borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries that it will not under any circumstances tolerate the use of its territory as a launching ground for operations aimed at destabilizing neighbouring countries, with which it wishes to remain on good terms. It is in the name of these same principles that the Government is compelled to reaffirm an unswerving solidarity towards the peoples of the occupied territories who are legitimately struggling against aggression and the occupation of a large portion of Congolese territory.

Third, the Government reaffirms its commitment to respect the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and all the relevant Security Council resolutions concerning armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Fourth, the Government reaffirms its desire to cooperate fully with the Joint Military Commission. It undertakes, in accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1341 (2001), to finalize and implement the plans established by the Political Committee for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement or repatriation (DDRRR) of all armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To this end, in accordance with the provisions of Council resolution 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001, it will provide all the necessary operational information.

In the Government's view, the diversionary tactic is designed to perpetuate the occupation of the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which demonstrates the link between the continuation of hostilities and the pillage and illegal exploitation of our country's resources and wealth.

This campaign is intensifying along with the progress in the peace process initiated by the Lusaka Agreement, conspicuously weakening the link between the progress in the peace process and the economic recovery of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 1355 (2001).

In fact, this campaign stems from a Machiavellian calculation: the two States fear the effects of a consolidated peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which would force them to democratize their regimes. This strategy of disinformation is reaching insulting proportions for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It aims to portray the latter as a terrorist State; what is more, it slows the momentum towards peace in the Great Lakes region.

In the light of the foregoing, the Government is compelled to point out the following to the international community:

1. **Rwanda and Burundi are making unproven assertions.** The burden of proof is on the accuser. The Congolese Government is convinced that the two countries are simply seeking to get out of their commitments under the Lusaka Agreement, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of their troops from Congolese territory. Moreover, a genuine operation is under way to influence world opinion in order to accomplish unacknowledged goals: continuing to occupy Congolese territory, massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, pillage and illegal exploitation of Congolese resources.

2. **The Democratic Republic of the Congo bears no responsibility for the 1994 genocide, which it strongly condemned, and remains in solidarity with**

its victims. It notes that it is still less accountable for the conflict situation in Burundi. It has no hidden agenda with regard to these two countries. The international community, therefore, cannot allow Rwanda and Burundi to use this as an asset to be exploited at will to the detriment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

3. **The Democratic Republic of the Congo confirms its determination to cooperate with the international community** in seeking out and identifying the perpetrators of the genocide in order to bring them before an international criminal tribunal.

4. **With regard to the recent intensification of violence in Rwanda**, the Government notes that it now stems mainly from two blatant factors reported by authoritative media and observers:

(a) The incursions into Rwanda of Rwandan oppositionists from Ugandan territory with the collusion of the Ugandan authorities themselves. These incursions are part of the fierce conflict between Rwanda and Uganda, as revealed by the three wars in Kisangani;

(b) The operations of Rwandan oppositionists inside Rwanda.

5. **The Government notes that the settlement of the conflict in the Great Lakes region requires a comprehensive solution** which implies that, parallel to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, a process of reconciliation and dialogue should be initiated without delay in the two countries concerned.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo again turns to the international community, emphatically urging that special attention be paid to the cries and tears of the families of the 2.5 million dead, innocent victims of the war of aggression in the occupied Congolese territories. In memory of these victims, the Government is preparing to transmit to the Security Council a request for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Lastly, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1355 (2001), the primary responsibility for restoring peace lies with the parties themselves, through measures to build confidence between them. For its part, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to honour its commitments so as to avoid any breach of this confidence, and to lay the groundwork for the return of a durable peace in the interests not only of the Congolese people, but of all the peoples of the Great Lakes region.

Kinshasa, 25 June 2001

United Nations S/2001/635

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2001

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the question of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Recommends to the General Assembly that Mr. Kofi Annan be appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations for a second term of office from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2006.

01-42920 (E) 270601